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I. ABSTRACT

The rights and obligations of states to their shared transboundary
groundwater are not fully understood. The primary reasons for this
are the complex characteristics and behaviours of groundwater, and
the lack of full understanding of its interconnection with the surrounding environment. Additionally, states appear to be reluctant in forming legally binding arrangements that specifically address this topic.
Difficult political situations further intensify this situation because the
parties sharing the groundwater are unable to foresee the benefits of
cooperation concerning this invisible resource. This article addresses
two primary issues: (1) the rules and principles of international law
that govern the utilization, development and management of transboundary groundwater resources; and, (2) the lessons that could be
learnt from international law to help achieve an integrative mutually
beneficial arrangement for the Palestinians and the Israelis on the
Mountain Aquifer. The article employs a multidisciplinary approach
that draws primarily from the disciplines of hydrology and law to address these two issues, taking into account the prevailing political situation within the area of study. The methodology is based on the understanding that the natural and physical characteristics of the international watercourse coupled with the social, political and economic
conditions of the region have a vital role to play in offering or hampering solutions for potential international water conflicts. The proposal
for approaching the problem within the Palestinian-Israeli context is to
progressively establish a solid basis for long-term sustainable arrangements. This progressive approach starts with a non-binding flexible
arrangement that will serve the short-term need, and gradually build
up into a final, legally binding arrangement based upon international
law.
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II. INTRODUCTION
"Solutions to partly resolve the world's water crisis may lay hidden
underground."' More than half of the world's population already depends on groundwater that is pumped from layers of rock or other
geological strata, known as aquifers,' which lie hidden below the
Earth's surface. "These formations can span thousands of kilometres
and contain enough water to satisfy all of humanity's demands [for
water] for many decades."4 Groundwater is the largest source of fresh
water available in reserve on Earth.5 "Of 37 million cubic kilomet
[res] ... of freshwater estimated to be present on this planet, about 22%
occurs below the land surface in the form of groundwater storage."'
"Excluding water locked in polar ice caps, this constitutes 97% of all
freshwater potentially available for human use."7 "Groundwater is in
general a high-value resource and is especially important as a source
for drinking water. In Europe, for instance, 75% of drinking water
supplies come from groundwater sources, with [reliance] up to 98% in
Denmark"8 and 100% in Lithuania.9 In arid or semi-arid regimes,
groundwater is almost the sole source of water supply for human and
other consumption."° Human dependence on groundwater as a major
source of water supply has been recently acknowledged and the risks
2. Press Release, UNESCO, Africa's Hidden Groundwater Resources (June 4,
2002), http://www.unesco.org/bpi/eng/unescopress/2002/02-39e.shtml.
3.

AMY OTCHET, THE NEW COURIER NO. 1, SCIENCE: OUR HIDDEN HYDRO-CAPITAL,

The New Courier No. I (UNESCO ed., 2004), at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL ID=6614&URL DO-DOPRINTPAGE&URL SECTION-201.html (last visited
Nov. 30, 2004). "Aquifer" means: Any subsurface geological formation, such as a layer
or layers of rock or other geological strata of sufficient porosity and permeability,
which contains water and from which it may be extracted in appreciable quantities.
Water that is in the upper zone of the soil is not included. See generally C.W. FETTER,
APPLIED HYDROGEOLOGY ch. 4, at 77 (3d ed. 1994) (discussing the properties of aquifers).
4. OTCHET, supra note 3.
5. THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO FRESHWATER
BIOD1VERSrTY CONSERVATION 139 (Nicole Silk & Kristine Ciruna eds., 2004),
http://www.freshwaters.org/pub/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2004). See also Stefano Burchi,
NationalRegulationsfor Groundwater: Optiona, Issues and Best Practices, in GROUNDWATER
LEGAL AND POtICY PERSPECTIVES: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORLD BANK SEMINAR 55, 55 (Salman
M.A. Salman ed., 1999) (explaining the importance of groundwater as a source for
drinking water supply).
6. Stephen Foster, Essential Concepts for Groundwater Regulators, in GROUNDWATER
LEGAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORLD BANK SEMINAR 15, 15 (Salman

M.A. Salman ed., 1999).
7. Id.
8. Burchi, supra note 5, at 55.
9. INT'L BENCHMARKING NETWORK, BENCHMARKING, WATER & SANITATION UTILITIFES:
CORE
INDICATOR
VALUES,
NODE:
LITHUANIA,
at
http://ww.ibnet.org/wb/bench/lithuania-node.htmfl (last visited Nov. 30, 2004).
10.

See

SLAVKO

BOGDANOVIC,

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

OF

WATER

RESOURCES

CONTRIBUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AssOCATION (1954-2000) 329 (1986).
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associated with depleting this valuable resource are widely recognized."
In physical terms, aquifers are of two major types: connected aquifers'"
and confined aquifers.'" The following discussion investigates and analyzes the way the law treats both types.
Transboundary groundwater' sometimes referred to as international or cross-border groundwater is used in virtually every continent
of the world" and is subject to the same competition for use as indigenous water resources. Many transboundary aquifers are found in Africa," the United States," Europe,'8 and the Middle East." "Because of
See Burchi, supra note 5, at 55.
11.
12. A connected aquifer is an aquifer connected to the surface water system and
annually replenished by water which finds its way to the saturated rock formations that
can hold and transmit water to wells and springs. Such aquifers occur in the following
situations: (i) when the aquifer is overlain by a low permeability or a leaky confining
layer that permits water to slowly flow through it; (ii) when the aquifers are "close to
the land surface, with continuous layers of materials of high intrinsic permeability
extending from the land surface to the base of the aquifer;" and (iii) when a layer of
low permeability material is found as a lens in more permeable materials where water
moving downwards is intercepted by this layer and will accumulate on the top of the
lens. FETTER, supra note 3, at I10.
13. Confined aquifers "are often described in the legal literature as "fossil" aquifers.
These are aquifers with no appreciable [recent] recharge and which cannot discharge
naturally. As a result, water in these aquifers is stagnant and has little if any flow. By
definition, they cannot be utilized sustainably as any withdrawal eventually will exhaust
the resource. Such aquifers generally contain ground water that is trapped in a geologic formation, either because of physical isolation of the aquifer from sources of
recharge, impermeability of overlying strata, or paucity of recharge in an arid region.
Typically, water in [confined] aquifers is hundreds if not thousands (or millions) of
years old." FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, "FOSSIL" AQuIFERS 1, at
http://www.fao.org/Legal/advserv/isarml.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2004) (based on
the notes contributed by Gabriel Eckstein). See FETTER, supra note 3, at 110, 286; EConference on the Management of Transboundary Groundwater Resources, Unesco
at
conference),
board
bulletin
internet
(unpublished
Board
Bulletin
3.html (last visited Nov. 25,
http://www.unesco.org/ubb/Forum24/HTML/0000O
2004) (providing additional information regarding the basic concept of renewable and
non-renewable aquifers).
14. Julio Barberis, The Development of InternationalLaw of Transbounday Groundwater,
31 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 167, 168 (1991) (explaining the four situations creating an international or transboundary aquifer: (i) where a confined aquifer is intersected by an
]
international boundary, "[t his aquifer is not linked hydrologically with other groundand
consequently, only the aquifer itself can be considered a
surface
water,
water or
shared natural resource;" (ii) where an aquifer lies entirely within the territory of one
state but has interconnections and interdependence with an international river; (iii)
where an aquifer is entirely situated within the territory on one state but recharged in
another State; and (iv) aquifers found entirely in the territory of one State but hydrogeologically connected with another aquifer in a neighbouring state).
15. BOGDANOVIC, supra note 10, at 328.
16. Examples of aquifers in Africa: the Northern Sahara Aquifer shared between
Algeria Tunisia and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; Chad Aquifer shared between Niger,
Chad, Sudan, Central African Republic, Nigeria and Cameron; Aquifer on the TaoudoniR2 in 'hared hrween Chd, F.ovnt, l.ihvn Arth amhiriy" Anrl ndqn,- zn the
Kalahari/Karoo multi-layered aquifer shared by Namibia Botswana and South Africa.

Issue I

PA LESTINIAN-ISRAEL GROUNDWA TER CONFLICT

the special problems that are present when more than one national
jurisdiction is involved, extraordinary concern has been shown for waters that are international in character.""0
A water scarce situation coupled with political instability and inequality in power structures between two nations sharing the same fixed
amounts of water is the most complex setting for resolving water conflicts. This is true in the region of the Middle East where political factors inevitably play a decisive role in the settlement of international
water disputes. This article inquires into the rules and principles governing the utilization of shared transboundary groundwater and questions how parties may initiate and implement cooperative frameworks
in the complex political context of the Mountain Aquifer. The main
objective of this research is to utilize lessons learnt from international
law to achieve an integrative, mutually beneficial arrangement for the
Mountain Aquifer.
A. BACKGROUND: GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES

Hydrologists, lawyers and water specialists collectively agree the primary two problems relating to groundwater management are pollution
and depletion.2 In general, depletion seriously threatens aquifers with

See

Bo
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RESOURCEs

ET AL.,
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FRAMEWORK
DOCUMENT
17
fig.7,
52
(Shammy
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/O012/001243/124386e.pdf
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MANAGEMENT:

A

Puri
ed.,
2001),
(last visited Nov. 30,

2004); INT'L GROUNDWATER RES. ASSESSMENT CTR., GLOBAL GROUNDWATER REGIONS 10

(2004), http://igrac.nitg.tno.nl/pics/regions-d.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2004).
17. Eighteen transboundary aquifers exist in the Mexico-United States border area.
E-Conference on the Management of Transboundary Groundwater Resources, supra
note 13.
18. See generally E. ALMASSY & Zs. BUZAS, UN/ECE TASK FORCE ON MONITORING AND
ASSESSMENT, VOL. 1: INVENTORY OF TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATERS (Sept. 1999) (documenting over 100 aquifers that shared by two or more states; examples include: the
aquifer system of the Vechte Catchment, shared by Germany and the Netherlands; and
the alluvial aquifer system shared by the Czech Republic and Poland), at
http://www.iwacriza.org/lWAC/IWACSite.nsf/7BAFC09E93A2EE9DC1256BB800476CI 2/$File/Task%
20Force%2OVol%201.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2004).
19. Examples include: the Mountain Aquifer shared between Palestine and Israel;
the Saq aquifer shared between Saudi Arabia and Jordan; and the Nubian Sandstone
aquifer in Sinai and Negev shared between Egypt and Israel. APPEL GREN ET AL., supra
note 16, at 15, 20.
20. U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, Management of International Water Resources: Institutional and Legal Aspects, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Legal
and Institutional Aspects of International Water Resources Development iii (1975).
21. Burchi, supra note 5, at 55; FETTER, supra note 3, at 13; Robert Hayton & Albert
Utton, Transboundway Groundwaters: The Bellagio Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 663,
663 (1989).
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over-exploitation and water quality degradation. The declining water
levels in transboundary aquifers can lead to increased costs in water
pumping and utilization and may trigger conflicts between states sharing the resources. " These two problems pose challenges that hydrogeologic and legal perspectives need to address. First, a better hydrogeologic understanding is needed on: (i) the interaction between
groundwater and other elements of the environment; 3 (ii) the complexity of the hydrogeological regime; (iii) the vulnerability of the aquifers to pollution; (iii) the nature of replenishment or recharge; (iv)
4
extraction and water table fluctuation; and (v) pollutants distribution.
Second, from a legal perspective, the issues are mainly related to the:
(i) identification of the scope and description of the groundwater resources;" (ii) identification of the rules and principles that govern the
allocation between uses at the national level; " (iii) legal entitlements of
States at the international level; 7 and (iv) implementation of these entitlements including the development of procedures, mechanisms and
institutions that ensure compliance and enforcement.
In addition to the physical complexity of groundwater as a resource
and due to its hidden nature, there is an inherent lack of hydrogeological data that results in a high degree of uncertainty in the estimation of key parameters required to characterize the aquifer system."
In hydrogeological terms, these cross-border resources can only be
estimated through good observations and measurements of selected
hydraulic parameters, analogous to the estimation process of other
See Albert E. Utton, The Development of InternationalGroundwater Law, 22 NAT.
95, 102 (1982). Excessive pumping of groundwater may lower water levels in groundwater wells; this increased depth requires more powerful pumps and
technical installations which has higher costs. Id.
22.

RFSOURCESJ.

23.
AND

THOMAS WINTER ETAL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR 1139, GROUNDWATER
(1998),
111
at
RESOURCE,
SINGLE
A
WATER
SURFACE

http://water.usgs.gov/pubs/circ/circl139/index.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2004).
24. SeeUtton, supra note 22, at 101-02.
25. This includes identification of the following: what groundwaters are at issue
(related groundwater, fossil waters ...etc), other states that share the resource, applicable existing legal agreements, the state's most important interests and the dependence
of the state on groundwater for use.
26. At the national level, the water code must specify the different types of water
use that are considered lawful as opposed to others, which the law does not recognize.
This allocation can be based on many criteria depending on the State's national water
policies. See Dante A. Caponera, Requirementsfor Drafting a Modern Water Code and Water
Legislation in the ESCWA Region, in EXPERT GROUP MEETING ON WATER LEGISLATION IN
THE ESCWA REGION 36 (1996) (on file with author).
27. At this preliminary stage there is a need to understand that the main concern at
the international level is identifying the "right to use water" or the "legal entitlements"
of the states from the shared resources that must be based on the customary principle
of international law "equitable and reasonable utilization." See generally INTERNATIONAL
WATER LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR CHARLES B. BOURNE

(Patricia Wouters

ed., 1997) (explaining the ight to utilize international water resources).
28. See Hayton & Utton, supra note 21, at 674-75.
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transboundary resources, such as fisheries and wildlife, each requiring
statistically sound observations." 9 While reliable data is the pillar for
successful management, and good regulation is the means for achieving cooperation between states, the absence of reliable information is
a perpetual concern typical for groundwater resources. 1 The complexity of the groundwater regime and the ambiguity of its characteristics
complicate the task of assessing these resources. At the national and
international levels, a policy decision is urgently required to identify or
map the boundaries of an aquifer before beginning to assess accurately
the quantity and quality of water it contains, which would require substantial investment and scientific expertise." This need calls for the
establishment of an information base that embraces comprehensive
data on general groundwater and, in particular, groundwater that
crosses political boundaries." Such an information base requires the
development of a comprehensive and credible monitoring system that
can generate the type of information and data needed. The monitoring system must be supplemented by assessment systems capable of
processing and transforming the data into reasonable and usable information for the enactment of the responsive rules and regulations.'
The development of comparable monitoring and assessment systems in
transboundary groundwater states sharing the same aquifer is essential.
This will ensure the confident exchange of data and information between them and consequently fulfil the objectives of cooperation.
B. TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATER LAW: THE NEED FOR MODERN DEVELOPMENT

The unique characteristics of a watercourse, and the need to use
water in a rational way, require legal solutions different from those
applicable in other branches of international law. ' This explains the
fact that international water law is widely recognised as a distinct
branch of international law. 6 Furthermore, the special requirements

29.

See ALMASY& BuzAS, supra note 18, at 149-50.
APPELGREN ET AL., supra note 16, at 9.
31. Important data include aquifer thickness, saturated thickness, depths, area,
quantity and quality of the area, transmissibility, permeability recharge areas and other
aquifer related parameters. See Hayton & Utton, supra note 21, at 688-91.
30.

32.

SeeAPPELGRENETAL., supra note 16, at8.

33.
34.

Id. at 21-23.
ALssy & BuzAs, supra note 18, at 150.

35.
See Lucius Caflisch, Preface to INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: SELECTED WRmI INGS OF
PROFESSOR CHARLEs B. BOURNE, supra note 27.
36.
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BAsINs 2-3 (A.H. Garretson et al. eds.,

1967). However, general principles of international law such as the notions of community and good friendship provide the foundation for the rules of international water
law. The Development of International Water Resources: The 'DrainageBasin Approach,' in
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of optimal and sustainable development of international groundwater
aquifers, and the alarming rate at which water resources are being
overexploited and polluted, suggest groundwater is increasingly becoming a high-value resource." In the case of non-renewable groundwater in confined aquifers, the problem is even more complex because
exploitation is prompting the development of more appropriate legal,
economic, social and institutional frameworks. The establishment of
cooperative frameworks and mechanisms for the utilization, development and protection of groundwater resources supplement these responses.
Whilst international law related to the use of international surface
watercourses has recently been subjected to remarkable development,'
the law governing transboundary groundwater appears to remain
rather uncertain." International law governing the non-navigational
uses of international watercourses has been developing during the last
fifty years. This body of law provides suitable guidance and adequate
legal instruments to settle conflicts and prevent disputes over shared
water resources." Hundreds of treaties address the major rivers of the
world, including the Niger," Nile," Danube" and the Mekong. Only

INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW:

SELECTED 'WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR CHARLES B. BOURNE,

supra note 27, at 3.
37. Burchi, supra note 5, at 55.
38. Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Evolution of the Law of International Watercourses, 45
AUSTRIANJ. OF PUB. & INT'L L. 87, 90 (1993). See U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS,
supra note 20, at 1-4; DANTE A. CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES OF WATER LAW AND
ADMINISTRATION: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 187-96 (1992) (detailing recent international conventions, treaties, and other laws related to surface water). See generally
William L. Griffin, The Use of Waters of InternationalDrainageBasins under Customary InternationalLaw, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 50 (1959) (providing a comprehensive overview of
major treaties governing international drainage basins).
39. For a review of international groundwater law evolution, see ROBERT HAYTON,
RAPPORTEUR, Report of the Committee on InternationalWater Resources Law: Part 11 - the Law
of International GroundwaterResources, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF
THE SIXTY-SECOND CONFERENCE HELD AT SEOUL 238-45 (1987).
40. Waltina Sheumann & Axel Klaphake, Deutsches Institute fur Entwicklungpolitilk, The Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of InternationalWatercourses
(Jan. 18, 2001), http://www.water-2001.de/supporting/WaterConvention.pdf (last
visited Nov. 27, 2004).
41. Convention Creating the Niger Basin Authority, Nov. 21, 1980, 1346 U.N.T.S
208 (entered into force Dec. 3, 1982); Agreement Concerning the Niger River Commission and the Navigation and Transport on the River Niger, Nov. 25, 1964, 587
U.N.T.S. 21 (entered into force Apr. 12, 1966); Act Regarding Navigation and Economic Co-operation Between the States of the Niger Basin, Oct. 26, 1963, 587 U.N.T.S.
11 (entered into force Feb. 1, 1966). See also Revised Convention Creating the Niger
Basin Authority, Oct. 29, 1987, UNITED NATIONS FAO LEGISLATIVE STUDY 61, TREATIES
CONCERNING THE NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES:

AFRICA,

http://www.fao.org/docrep/W7414B/w7414b00.htm#Contents;
42. Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, Nov. 8, 1959, U.A.R.Sudan, 6519 U.N.T.S. 64 (entered into force Dec. 12, 1959).
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few regulate both international surface and groundwater, and those
rarely deal with transboundary groundwater as a distinct subject of the
law.
"At the commencement of the 21st century water scarcity is taking
the dimension of growing global risk. The concern is becoming most
evident in the arid and semi-arid areas of Africa where shortage and
lack of access to water form the main causes for poverty, dwindling
public health and food insecurity."" "The scarcity and rapid depletion
of water in one of the world's driest regions constitutes a major determinant to the domestic and external policies of the major actors in the
Middle East."4 The large variations in rainfall and limited surface resources have led to widespread scarcity of the fresh water resources in
the region, resulting in a heavy reliance on groundwater as the major
source for various uses." The contribution of surface water to the
overall water balance is limited and marginal." Finally, due to the increasing dependence on groundwater, conflicts over the use and development of transboundary groundwater aquifers are expected to
grow in the coming few decades, and there is an increasing need to
achieve a more optimal, equitable and sustainable utilisation of these
resources through better co-operation between those sharing the waters. This cooperation is essential for the maintenance of peace and
the avoidance of conflicts.

43. Convention on Co-operation for Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube,June 29,1994 [hereinafter 1994 Danube Convention],
http://ocid.nacse.org/qml/research/tfdd/toTFDDdocs/331ENG.htm (last visited
Nov. 27, 2004); Agreement on the Co-operation on Management of Water Resources
in the Danube Basin, Dec. 1, 1987, F.R.G.-Aus.,
http://ocid.nacse.org/qml/research/tfdd/toTFDDdocs/278ENG.htm (last visited
Nov. 27, 2004).
44. Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, Apr. 5, 1995, Cambodia-Laos-Thail.-Vietnam,
http://ocid.nacse.org/qml/research/tfdd/toTFDDdocs/170ENG.htm (last visited
Nov. 27, 2004);Joint Declaration of Principles for the Utilization of the Lower Mekong
Basin, Jan. 31, 1975, Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam,
http://ocid.nacse.org/qml/research/tfdd/toTFDDdocs/155ENG.htm (last visited
Nov. 27, 2004).
45.

INT'L Assoc. OF HYDROLOGISTS, INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON MANAGING SHARED

AQUIFERS RESOURCES IN AFRICA 1 (June 2-4, 2002),
http://www.iah.org/isarm/TripoliWorshopreport.doc (last visited Nov. 30, 2004).
46. WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: CONFLICT OR COOPERATION? (Thomas Naff & Ruth
C. Matson eds., 1984).
47. Fadia Daibes, Water: The Blue Gold of the Middle East, PALESTINIAN ACADEMIC
SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, July 2002, at 3, http://passia.org.
48. Id.
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III. TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATER LAW- SUBSTANTIVE
AND PROCEDURAL RULES
A. BACKGROUND

When investigating the primary sources of international law governing transboundary groundwater, and considering the lack of a
"multilateral law making treaty," the work of international organizations and expert groups in the field comprises a first step in that endeavour. This covers the work of the International Law Institute
("IDI")," the International Law Association ("ILA"), and the International Law Commission ("ILC")," and the work of the expert-group on
the Bellagio Draft Treaty." This article proposes that the work of these
institutions and groups is evidence of the law, especially the work of
the ILC due to its authoritative institutional character. Other subsidiary legal sources include arbitration and judicial decisions, nonbinding international declarations, statements and resolutions.
B. SCOPE AND USE OF TERMS

The "scope and use of terms" is a critical element in determining "what" waters a legal arrangement includes, and "which" areas it
regulates. Accordingly, the definition of this element in a specific legal
instrument is a determining factor in whether or not transboundary
groundwater is covered and ipsofacto the manner in which it is treated.
In the context of this research, the key issues that need to be investigated are: (i) whether or not including transboundary groundwater
within the scope of an international watercourse agreement is a common practice that states accept, and (ii) whether or not such waters
include connected as well as confined transboundary groundwater.
The answers to these two main questions lies within the work of the
49. ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, Institute of InternationalLaw (2004) (explaining that the IDI (Institut de Droit International) was established "in Ghent, Belgium,
in 1873 to develop and implement international law as a codified science"), at
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?tocld=90971 31 (last accessed Oct. 15, 2004).
50. INT'L LAW ASS'N, HISTORY OF THE ILA (explaining the foundation of the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations, later renamed the International Law Association, in Brussels in October 1873. Its objects include: "the study,
elucidation and advancement of international law, public and private, the study of

comparative law, the making of proposals for the solution of conflicts of law and for
the unification of law, and the furthering of international understanding and goodwill"), at http://www.ila-hq.org/html/layout-about.htm (last visited Sept. 2003).
51.

See INT'L LAW COMM'N, INTRODUCTION (explaining that the General Assembly

established the International Law Commission in 1947 "to promote the progressive
at
codification"),
its
and
law
of
international
development
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/introfra.htm (last visitedJan. 2003).
52.

S'e gemnrally Hnytnn A Ihon. sntra note 21 (examining the work done on the

Bellagio Draft Treaty).
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ILC, IDI, ILA and the Bellagio Draft Treaty, including the scope of the
ILC 1991 and 1994 Draft Articles," and consequently the adopted 1997
United Nations Watercourses Convention. 4 By and large, there is evidence that the term "watercourse system" was favoured by the ILC
members and the state representatives in the comments and observations to the Draft. Many states avoided the concept of the "drainage

53. Report of Int'l Law Comm'n on the Work of its 43d Session, 46 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991), reprinted in [1991] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1991/Add.1 [hereinafter 1991 Draft]. Part I embraced the introduction, which reflected the scope of the articles, use of terms, and watercourse
agreements. Id. at 66. Part II incorporated the general principles namely equitable
and reasonable utilization and participation, the obligation not to cause appreciable
harm, the general obligation to cooperate, regular exchange of data and information
and the relationship between uses. Id. at 67. Part III dealt with planned measures
encompassing the obligations for information, notification and consultation as far as
planned measures are concerned. Id. at 67-68. Part IV handled the issues of protection and preservation of the ecosystems, prevention and control of pollution. Id. at 68.
Part V addressed harmful conditions and emergency situations. Id. at 69. Finally, Part
VI included some miscellaneous provisions on management, regulation, installations,
international watercourses and installations in times of armed conflicts, data and information vital to national defense or security and non-discrimination. Id. at 69-70.
Report of the Int'l Law Comm'n on the Work of its 46th Session, 49 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
10), U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994), reprinted in [1994] 2Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 88, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 [hereinafter 1994 Draft] (including the ILC's report
to the Secretary General of the U.N. on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, availableat
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/94nonnav.pdf#pagemode=bookmarks (last visited
Nov. 28, 2004)).
54. United Nations: Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 [hereinafter 1997 U.N. Watercourses Convention]. A majority of States voted in favour of the Convention (103)
indicating that the rules embodied in the Convention were acceptable; only three
States voted against (Burundi, China and Turkey) and 27 abstained: Andorra, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Columbia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Israel, Mali, Monaco, Mongolia, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Rwanda, Spain, Tanzania, and Uzbekistan. Id. Article 36 of the
Convention stipulates that it would require 35 instruments of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession for the Convention to enter force. Id. at 715.
55. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Comments and Observations Received from States, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 146, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/51/275/Add.1 (1996) [hereinafter
Convention on Non-Navigational Uses] (describing Italy's support for the term "international watercourse); Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Draft Articles on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses and Resolution on Confined Transboundary Groundwater, U.N.
GAOR, 51st Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 146, at 21-24, U.N. Doc. A/51/275 (1996)
[hereinafter Draft Articles] (explaining Venezuela, Finland, Hungary, Portugal, and
Turkey's support for the concept of an international watercourse). As of 15_lune 1976,
32 Member States have submitted replies to the questionnaire formulated by the
Commission in 1974. See The Law on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Comments and Observations Received from Governments, 45th Sess.,
Agenda Item 4, at 145, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/447, reprinted in [1993] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
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basin" because, according to them, it induced problems related to
states' territorial sovereignty. 6 An analysis of the work by the IDI, ILA
and the expert group on the Bellagio Draft Treaty reveals some crucial
differences in the treatment of scope and use of terms that govern the
utilization and development of such resources. The 1961 IDI Salzburg
Resolution 7 and the 1966 ILA Helsinki Rules"6 employed similar concepts that considered connected groundwater as an integral component of the hydrologic cycle, subject to the same principles and rules as
the other physical components. In effect, these instruments did not
include confined transboundary aquifers within their scope and, further, did not treat groundwater as a special component of the hydrological cycle. The 1986 ILA Seoul Rules, 9 which are complimentary to
the Helsinki Rules, were developed with a view that groundwater is
special in its characteristics and behaviour and thus requires special
treatment for management and protection.'
Moreover, the Seoul

Comm'n 145, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1993/Add.1 (providing details of the member states comments).
56. See, e.g., Draft Articles, supra note 55, at 21-22 (stating both Columbia and
Ethiopia's opposition to groundwater regulation on the grounds of national sovereignty).
57. Utilisation des Eaux Interlationales Non Maritimes (en Dehors de la Navigation) [Utilisation of Non-maritime International Waters (Except for Navigation)]
(Sept. 11, 1961), http://www.idi-iil.org/idiF/navigchronl953.html [hereinafter Salzburg Resolution]. The Resolution was passed by a vote of 50 to 0, with 1 abstention.
Draft Articles, supra note 55, at 38 n.1 15. The Salzburg Resolution applies to the "utilization of waters which form part of a watercourse or hydrographic basin which extends
over the territory of two or more States." Salzburg Resolution, supra, at art. 1. Transboundary groundwater is implicitly embedded in the hydrographic basin and does not
respond to the special requirements of these resources. Accordingly, the Resolution is
only considered an adequate foundation for the formulation of more specialized rules
at the international level concerning groundwater.
58. INT'I. LAW ASS'N, Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters ofInternationalRivers, in
REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SECOND CONFERENCE HELD AT HELSINKI 477,484-85 (1967) [hereinafter Helsinki Rules], available at
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/IntlDocs/HelsinkiRules.htm. Article II of the
Rules identifies the Drainage Basin as: "a geographical area extending over two or
more States determined by the watershed limits of the system of waters, including surface and underground waters, flowing into a common terminus." Id at 484-85. "The
underground waters constituting a part of the drainage basin described in this article
are those that contribute to the drainage basin principal river, stream or lake or other
common terminus." Id. at 485.
59. INT'L LAW ASS'N, Rules on International Groundwater, in REPORT OF THE SIXTYSECOND CONFERENCE HELD AT SEOUL 251, 251 (1987) [hereinafter Seoul Rules]. The
term "aquifer" employed in the Seoul Rules "comprehends all underground water
bearing strata capable of yielding water on a practicable basis, whether these are in
other instruments or contexts called by another name such as 'groundwater reservoir',
'groundwater catchment area,' etc. including the waters in fissured rock formations
and the structures containing deep, so-called 'fossil waters.'" Id.
60.
S, id at 9rq-71 (nddrpWinua variety of wAvq in acknowledge the imnortance of
international protection of groundwater).
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Rules include confined aquifers within their scope." The Bellagio
Draft Treaty defined transboundary groundwater in the same manner
as the 1986 Seoul Rules,"2 thus including connected and disconnected
aquifers within its scope. The Draft Treaty also introduced the term
"underground environment," which not only included "the quality and
quantity of waters, but, inter alia, the geologic structure of the water
body, the aquifer itself" affecting these properties." The "Resolution
on Confined Transboundary Aquifers," which the ILC adopted in conjunction with the 1994 Draft Articles, included confined aquifers
within the scope of its application.' This Resolution was not adopted
as part of the final text of the United Nations Watercourses Convention. In May 2003 the ILC returned to the question of transboundary
confined aquifers. In his first report on "Shared Natural Resources,"
Chusei Yamada, the special Rapporteur, emphasized that "[i]n order
to formulate rules regulating confined transboundary groundwaters,
we must have an inventory of these resources worldwide and a breakdown of the different regional characteristics of the resources. National, regional and international organizations are currently studying
and assessing such major aquifer systems."" He further emphasized
the need for a multitude of studies to be conducted, which include:
(a) Socio-economic importance: groundwater is becoming increasingly important for all populations, but particularly for the populations of the developing world. The development aspects of groundwater are being extensively studied by the World Bank Groundwater
Management Advisory Team;
(b) The practice of states with respect to use and management;

61. Id. at 259. ( stating "[a]n aquifer intersected by the boundary between two or
more States that does not contribute water to, or receive water from, surface waters of
an international drainage basin constitutes an international drainage basin for the
purpose of the Helsinki Rules.").
62. Hayton & Utton, supra note 21, at 679. Article I (1), of the Bellagio Draft
Treaty, identifies "Aquifer" as: "a subsurface water bearing geologic formation from
which significant quantities of water may be extracted." Id. at 677. Article 1 (20) identifies a "Transboundary aquifer" as "an aquifer intersected by a common boundary."
Id.
at 679. The commentary to Article I explains that the term "aquifer" "comprehends
all underground water-bearing strata capable of yielding water on a practicable basis,
whether these are in other instruments or contexts called by another name such as
'groundwater reservoir,' 'groundwater catchment area,' etc. including the waters in
fissured or fractured rock formations and the structures containing deep, so called
'fossil waters."' Id.
63. Id. at 683.
64. 1994 Draft, supra note 53, at 154-55.
65. Chusei Yamada, Special Rapporteur, Shared NaturalResources.-First Report on Outlines, U.N. GAOR 55th Sess., 24, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/533 (2003).
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(c) Contamination: causes and activities which adversely affect the resources as well as its prevention and remedial measures;
(d) Cases of conflicts;
(e) Legal aspects: existing domestic legislation and international
agreements for management of the resources;
(f) Bibliography of materials of direct relevance to the work of the
Commission [ILC].6
The next sections examine the relevance of the codification and
progressive development undertaken by the various institutions mentioned above.
C. SUBSTANTIVE RULES
Substantive rules within a specific legal arrangement determine the
rights and duties of states towards each other, the violation of which
raises liability. The key issues to be investigated in the context of
transboundary groundwater are: (i) what are these rules and to what
extent they present rules of customary international law; and (ii) the
evolution of these rules in the work of the ILC, IDI, ILA and the Bellagio Draft Treaty. Having reviewed the work of these organizations,
there is a collective agreement that the right for using the waters of
international watercourse derives from the fundamental right of states
to equitably use waters that traverse or border their territory. The extent to which the obligation not to cause a certain degree of harm limits this right varies from one approach to another. The 1991 and 1994
Draft Articles, which apply equally to surface water and connected
transboundary groundwater, considered equitable utilization a fundamental principle of customary international law. 7 Both drafts, however, gave primacy to the "no harm" rule over the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.6 This was corrected in the final text of
the 1997 United Nations Watercourses Convention, whereby the equi-

66. Id. 25.
67. 1991 Draft, supra note 53, at 67 (stating "1.Watercourse States shall in their
respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international watercourse shall be used and developed
by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimum utilization thereof and benefits
therefrom consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse. 2. Watercourse
States shall participate in the use, development and protection of an international
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. Such participation includes both
the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to cooperate in the protection and
development thereof, as provided in the present articles.").
68.

Id. at 68 (stating "[w]atercourse States shall utilize an international watercourse

in such a way as not to cause appreciable harm to other watercourse States.").
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table and reasonable utilization principle became predominant, although it included a factor related to the degree of harm."
Under the Salzburg Resolution, the general principle governing
neighbourly relations and the use of shared waters in particular was the
obligation not to cause "unlawful harm" to others.' In its approach,
the Resolution applied the "limited sovereignty theory" by limiting the
right of use of any state to the waters flowing across or bordering its
territory by the right of use by the other states concerned with the
same river or "hydrographic basin."'" When utilizing the waters, states
are obliged not to seriously affect the possibility of other states utilizing
the same waters."0 In the case of serious damage or loss, states causing
the harm are obliged to ensure the affected state or states enjoy the
advantages of their utilization rights "on the basis of equity, taking particular account of their respective needs" and "other pertinent circumstances."7 The affected state is also entitled to adequate compensation." Equitable and reasonable utilization govern within the 1966
Helsinki Rules and all of the work by the ILA. Article V lists the factors
determining equitable and reasonable sharing, whereby harm is only
one factor." Under the 1966 Helsinki Rules, pollution is viewed to
69. 1997 U.N. Watercourses Convention, suprt note 54, at 706 (stating "2. Where
significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse State, the States, whose
use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard for the provisions of articles 5 and 6, in consultation
with the affected State, to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to
discuss the question of compensation.").
70. Salzburg Resolution, supra note 57, pmbl. paras. 3, 4.
71. Id. art. 2 (stating " [e]very State has the right to utilize waters which traverse or
border its territory, subject to the limits imposed by international law and, in particular, those resulting from the provisions which follow.").
72. Id. art. 4. (stating "[n]o State can undertake works or utilizations of the waters
of a watercourse or hydrographic basin which seriously affect the possibility of utilization of the same waters by other States except on condition of assuring them the enjoyment of the advantages to which they are entitled under article 3, as well as adequate compensation for any loss or damage.").
73. Id. art. 3, 4.
74. The requirement of compensation is however not an established principle in
international law.
See The Right to Utilize the Waters of International Rivers, in
INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR CHARLES

B. BOURNE,

supra note 27, at 82 (arguing that compensation is not obligatory).
75. Helsinki Rules, supra note 58, at 488 (stating "(1) What is a reasonable and
equitable share within the meaning of Article IV to be determined in the light of all
the relevant factors in each particular case. (2) Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but are not limited to: (a) the geography of the basin, including in
particular the extent of the drainage area in the territory of each basin State; (b) the
hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution of water by each basin
State; (c) the climate affecting the basin; (d) the past utilization of the waters of the
basin, including in particular existing utilization; (e) the economic and social needs of
each basin State; (f) the population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin
State; (g) the comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the economic and
social needs of each basin State; (h) the availability of other resources; (i) the avoid-
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constrain the beneficial and equitable utilization of such waters and
therefore there is an obligation to abate pollution."6 As for the Seoul
Rules, they clearly state the same principles that govern utilization in
the 1966 Helsinki Rules equally apply to transboundary groundwater.77
The principle of equitable and reasonable utilization and the no harm
rule govern in the Bellagio Draft Treaty."
D. PROCEDURAL RULES

Procedural rules are essential in any watercourse agreement. They
provide the means through which the substantive rules are implemented. The distinction between the "substantive" and "procedural"
obligations is made mostly for analytical purposes to better understand
the treaty structure and requirements. This does not mean "procedural" obligations are less binding than "substantive" obligations. Procedural rules encompass a range of obligations from a general duty to
cooperate, to obligations concerning data and information exchange,
prior notification and consultations. By and large, the above legal instruments have common denominators as far as procedural rules are
concerned. These procedures establish adequate mechanisms for cooperation with a special emphasis on the generation of a reliable database at the national level, and the maintenance of adequate information exchange at the international level. The basic procedural rules
that are considered obligatory for connected transboundary groundwater are the duty to exchange information and prior notification. Based
on the research undertaken, cooperation in itself does not have a
normative content. It is a duty that derives from the general principles
of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and the good
faith of states. States are further encouraged based on their "good
faith" to consult and negotiate.
ance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of the basin; (j) the practicability
of compensation to one or more of the co-basin States as a means of adjusting conflicts
among uses; and (k) the degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied,
without causing substantial injury to a co-basin State. (3) The weight to be given to
each factor is to be determined by its importance in comparison with that of other
relevant factors. In determining what is reasonable and equitable share, all relevant
factors are to be considered together and a conclusion reached on the basis of the
whole.").
76. Id. at 494-97.
77. Seoul Rules, supra note 59, at 259. See also BOGDANOVIC, supra note 10, at 342.
78. Hayton & Utton, supra note 21, at 676, 691. The Parties enter the Draft
Agreement "[sleeking to provide for the utilization, protection and control of those
groundwaters on an equitable basis and, to that end, for the creation and maintenance
of an adequate data base..." Id. at 676. In addition, "[t]he Parties undertake cooperatively to protect and to improve, insofar as practicable, the quality of transboundary
aquifers and their waters in conjunction with their programs for surface water quality
control and to avorid nnrerinhl hqrm in or to the terrirories of the Parties." Id. at
691.
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The procedural rules within the 1991 Draft were embodied in Articles 9 through 19. These procedures were a natural consequence of
the obligation to cooperate that is embodied in Article 8 within the
duty to cooperate.79 The eleven articles are considered a road map for
states to implement equitable and reasonable utilization of their
shared watercourses, including connected transboundary groundwater." The procedural rules within the 1994 Draft, found in Articles 9 to
19, did not vary much from those of the 1991 Draft. Procedures relating to the exchange of data, prior notification and prior consultation
on planned measures in the 1994 Draft were similar to those found in
the 1991 Draft Articles. According to paragraph 2 of the commentary
on Article 12, these procedures were "triggered by the criterion that
measures planned by a watercourse [s]tate may have a significant adverse effect upon other watercourse [s]tates."8 Paragraph 1 of Article
8 on the duty to cooperate remained almost the same as it was in the
1994 Draft."
The 1961 Salzburg Resolution emphasised the need for consultation, joint planning and the application of the principle of reciprocity
among the states sharing these resources to promote a more rational
exploitation of natural resources." The 1961 Salzburg Resolution considered notification at the heart of the procedural rules, recommending states not undertake utilizations or works without a previous notice
to interested states.' The Resolution did not refer to a specific period
for the reply but mentioned that it must be within a reasonable time.'
Procedural rules in the1966 Helsinki Rules were referred to as
"preventive measures," which encompassed the exchange of relevant
and reasonably available information among Co-Basin States concerning the "Hydrographic Basin" and its use of, and activities with respect
to such waters. " Prior notification of any proposed construction or
79. 1991 Draft, supra note 53, at 67 (stating "[w]atercourse States shall cooperate
on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and mutual benefit in order to
attain optimal utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse.").
80. See, e.g., Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N.
52
(1974),
31,
at
No.
Sess.,
Supp.
GAOR,
29th
http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/resins.htm ( stating "[i]n the exploitation of
natural resources shared by two or more countries, each State must co-operate on the
basis of a system of information and prior consultations in order to achieve optimum
use of such resources without causing damage to the legitimate interest of others." The
United States Mexico on co-operation of 1983 is an example of the importance of
cooperation for the protection, improvement and conservation of the environment
and the problems, which affect it.
81. 1994 Draft, supra note 53, at 75.
82. Compare 1991 Draft, supra note 53, at 67, with 1994 Draft, supra note 53, at 56-57.
83. Salzburg Resolution, supra note 57, pmbl. paras. 1-6.
84. Id. art. 5.
85. Id. art. 6.
86. Helsinki Rules, supra note 58, at 518-19.
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installation that would affect the regime of the basin and might give
rise to conflict was recommended.87 The same procedural rules that
applied within the 1966 Helsinki Rules equally applied in the Seoul
complimentary Rules.' The Seoul Rules provided that in order to realise the objectives of the rules," "Basin States shall consult and exchange relevant available information and data..."0 Basin States were
also recommended to cooperate "for the purpose of collecting and
analyzing additional needed information and data pertinent to the
9
Consultation and exinternational groundwaters or their aquifers."
change of relevant information are essential procedures in the context
of pollution prevention or abatement of international groundwater.2
The Bellagio Draft Treaty offered the comprehensive integrated
approach to defining what rules of procedures were needed to ensure
successful implementation of the Treaty.'3 These were tailor-made for
transboundary groundwater' and, therefore, constitute an important,
relevant guide for developing procedural rules on transboundary
groundwater. The Draft Treaty, similar to the ILA Rules, urged states
to "develop and maintain reliable data and information concerning
transboundary aquifers and their waters in order to use and protect
these waters in a rational and informed manner."5 Article V was deIt
voted to the "Establishment and Maintenance of the Database."'
provided that "[t] he Commission [was] charged with the creation and
maintenance of a comprehensive and unified database pertaining to
transboundary groundwaters, in the languages of the Parties. '""l
Greater knowledge about the quality and quantity of transboundary
groundwater is essential for the improvement of the management of
such resources." "Regular and systematic collection of hydrometeorological, hydrological and hydrogeological data needs to be promoted

87. Id. at518.
88. See Seoul Rules, supra note 59, at 252.
89. The objective of the Seoul Rules stipulated in Article 3 is: to "prevent or abate
the pollution of international groundwaters" with special emphasis on long-term pollution. Id. at 268.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 268. Article 3 states: "2. Basin States shall consult and exchange relevant
available information and data at the request of any of them (a) for the purpose of
preserving the groundwaters of the basin from degradation and protecting from impairment of geologic structure of the aquifers, including recharge areas; (b) for the
purpose of considering joint or parallel quality standards and environmental protecLion measures applicable to international groundwaters and their aquifers. Id.
92. See id. at 269-70.
93. SeeHayton & Utton, supra note 21, at 663.
94. Id. at 676.
95. Id. at 682-83.
96. Id. at 688.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 689-90.
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and be accompanied by a system for processing quantitative and qualitative information for various types of water bodies.""
In order to fulfil the objectives of data and information exchange
between watercourse states, the Draft Treaty called for countries to:
[e]stablish observation networks and strengthen existing systems and
facilities for measurements and recording fluctuations in groundwater quality and level; organize the collection of all existing data on
ground water (borehole logs, geological structure, and hydrogeological characteristics, etc.); systematically index such data, and attempt a
quantitative assessment so as to determine the present status of and
gaps in knowledge; increase the search for, and determination of, the
variables of aquifers1°
Prompt notification of any actual or planned activity that might
cause "appreciable harm" on the transboundary groundwaters or recharge areas was meant to ensure groundwater quality and quantity
protection."' Also, as part of the quality and quantity conservation
plan, Draft Treaty provides that any area within the border region containing transboundary groundwaters would be declared a Transbound-2
ary Groundwater Conservation Area determined by selected criteria. 1
Preparing a Comprehensive Management Plan was recommended for
each declaration of a Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area
to guarantee "the rational development, use, protection and control of
the waters in the Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area."'"3
99. Id.
100. Id. at 690.
101. Id. at 691 (stating "1. The Parties undertake cooperatively to protect and to
improve, insofar as practicable, the quality of transboundary aquifers and their waters
in conjunction with their programs for surface water quality control, and to avoid appreciableharm in or to the territories of the Parties. 2. The Governments shall promptly
inform the Commission of any actual or planned, significantly polluting discharge into
transboundary groundwaters or recharge areas, or of other activity with the potential
for significant leaching into transboundary groundwaters.") (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 692-93 (listing the factors considered by the Commission when making
their determination, such as "a. [whether] groundwater withdrawals exceed or are to
exceed recharge so as to endanger yield or water quality or are likely to diminish water,
the quantity or quality of interrelated surface waters; b. recharge has been or may become impaired; c. the use of the included aquifer(s) as an important source of drinking water has been, or may become impaired; d. the aquifer(s) have been or may become contaminated; and c. recurring or persistent drought conditions necessitate
management of all or some water supplies in the particular area.").
Id. at 695. This article includes a list of possible elements to be included in the
103.
Plan. Allocation of uses under the Plan shall take into account some factors listed under article VIII, paragraph 3. This list to determine equitable use is based on the 1966
Helsinki Rules factors and the Third Report of the Special Rapporteur, Stephen
Schwebel. Id. at 699-701. The factors include "a.hydrogeology and meteorology; b.
existing and planned uses; c. environmental sensitivity; d. quality control requirements;
e. socio-economic implications (including dependency); f. water conservation practices
(including efficiency of water use); e.g., artificial recharge potential; and h. compara-
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The Master Plan was to include a description of what measures were
needed, (i) "to prevent, eliminate or mitigate degradation of transboundary groundwater quality" and quantity;'" (ii) "to allocate the uses
of groundwaters and interrelated surface waters taking into account
the other allocation(s) previously made applicable within the Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area;"',0 and to limit pumping,
set a "criteria for well placement and number of wells," decisions on
"retirement of existing wells, imposition of extraction fees, [and]
planned depletion regimes or reservations of groundwaters for future
use.
E. INSTITUTIONAL AND DISPUTE SETrLEMENT MECHANISMS

Institutions are the vehicles for cooperation; thus, they can also be
a platform for dispute resolution. 7 In fact, it is a relatively common
feature of legal arrangements established to manage the transboundary watercourses. The functions and authorities of the institutions established to implement the obligations under the legal arrangement
may range from pure technical cooperation to full authority over water
management and protection plans and activities." The territorial responsibilities may include the whole drainage basin, including surface
waters, ground water, or both; more than one drainage basin (multibasin); part of a drainage basin (sub-basin); an area otherwise defined
and clearly delimited; or all or part of boundary waters. The institutional mechanism may consist of a permanent joint body," a joint

tive costs and implications of alternative sources of supply. The weight to be given to
each factor is to be determined by its importance in comparison with that of the other
relevant factors." Id at 696-97.
104. Id. at 696 (including measures, such as the classification, assessment and monitoring of transboundary groundwaters according to use and establishing criteria for
safe storage of all possible sources that may cause pollution to aquifers, monitoring of
water quality, providing the requirement for establishing protection zones).
105. Id.
106. Id. When planning depletions, " [tl he Commission, after evaluation of all relevant considerations, may prepare and, with the consent of the Governments, may approve a plan for the depletion of an aquifer over a calculated period. The plan may
apportion the uses and specify the rates and means of extraction of the transboundary
groundwaters, and may authorize advances, exchanges and transboundary transfers of
water consistent with the objectives of the Depletion Plan." Id. at 703.
107. See U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, supra note 20, at 27-28.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Agreement for the Establishment of the Organization for the Management and Development of the Kagera River Basin, Aug. 24, 1977, Rwanda-BurundiTanz.,
(entered
into
force
Feb.
5,
1978),
http://ocid.nacse.org/qml/research/tfdd/toTFDDdocs/200ENG.pdf;
Convention
Relating to the Status of the River Gambia, June 30, 1978, Gam.-Guinea-Sen.,
http:ocid.nacse.org/qml/research/tfdd/toTFDDdocs/263ENG.htm
(establishing
permanent committees).
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commission that convenes on a regular basis,' 0 or regular meetings of
national representatives.
Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations addresses dispute
settlement of an international watercourse when states disagree about
the utilization of the waters of an international watercourse." The
provision encourages states to seek a solution through a variety of
methods, including mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or peaceful
means of their own choice."'
In the context of this research, one of the key issues is to understand whether or not there is a customary duty to establish mechanisms
for institutional cooperation and for dispute settlement. It is essential
to understand how the various codification and progressive development attempts addressed these issues and what guidance they provide
in the case of transboundary groundwater.
The 1994 Draft Articles and the 1997 United Nations Watercourses
Convention encouraged the establishment of proper institutional
mechanisms to facilitate the implementation of the legal arrangements."' The final text of the 1997 United Nations Watercourses Convention did not include details on types of organizational structures of
such institutions, because it left those up to the discretion of states involved."' Additionally, the Convention introduced the dispute settlement mechanisms as compulsory provisions, thus presenting the ILC
with highly controversial and progressive developments."5
The 1961 IDI Salzburg Resolution offered only minimal guidance
on the type and structure of institutions responsible for the implementation of the agreements."' However, the recommendation was clear
regarding the establishment of a joint institution to implement the
agreement."7 The 1966 ILA Helsinki Rules did not include a section
110. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the Federal People's Republic
ofYugoslavia and the Government of the People's Republic of Albania Concerning
Water Economy Questions, Together With the Statute of the Yugoslav-Albanian Water
Economic Commission and With the Protocol Concerning Fishing in Frontier Lakes
and Rivers, Dec. 5, 1956, Alb.-Yugoslavia, art. 7 (entered into force on Aug. 6, 1957),
http://ocid.nacse.org/qml/research/fdd/toTFDDdocs/97ENG.htm ; Agreement
Between the Republic of Syria and the Hashemite Kingdom ofJordan Concerning the
Utilization of the Yarmuk Waters,June 4, 1953,Jordan-Syria, art. 10 (a)-(j) (entered
into force onJuly 8, 1953),
http://ocid.nacse.org/qml/research/tfdd/toTFDDdocs/82ENG.htm (establishing
joint committees convened on a regular basis).
111. 1997 U.N. Watercourses Convention, supra note 54, at 713-14.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 703; 1994 Draft, supra note 53, at 11 -12.
114. See 1997 U.N. Watercou rses Convention, supranote 54, at 704-05.
115. Id. at 713-14.
116. Salzburg Resolution, supra note 57, art. 9.
117. Id.
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on institutional mechanisms, although the section on the prevention
and settlement of disputes discussed the role of joint agency."8 Such
an institution was envisaged to play a role in situations of conflict. The
Draft Treaty encouraged Basin States to establish a 'Joint Commission"
responsible for the implementation of an agreement that would include responsibility for all transboundary groundwaters related matters."' The Joint Commission was mandated to undertake a variety of
tasks and functions to fulfil the requirements of the Draft Treaty."
M. TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATER LAW IN STATE
PRACTICE
A. INTRODUCTION
Whilst states have concluded thousands of treaties on international
watercourses, state treaty practice is still unclear concerning transboundary groundwater. States can choose to be a party to a various
range of arrangements, both formal and informal. Additionally, States
can enter into non-binding cooperation arrangements. This fact
greatly complicates the task of assessing what constitutes state practice.
In the absence of formal agreements, states appear satisfied to maintain less formal co-operation arrangements. Bilateral and multilateral
agreements between states are usually good evidence of states' willingness and acceptance to abide by the rules and principles embodied
within these agreements. The significance of treaties derives from the
fact that they are not created in vacuum; rather, they are the accumulation and conglomeration of norms, customs and general principles."'
Notwithstanding the foregoing, and given the wide range of
agreements that states can participate in, treaties do not necessarily
always contribute to the formulation of international legal rules or
principles, nor do they always codify an existing custom."' With the
exception of jus cogens, states might agree to replace or modify a recognized general rule with a particular rule by special agreement.
Other types of treaties aim to confirm general rules or to apply these
rules, The goal within this area of research is to identify where treaties
118. Helsinki Rules, supra note 58, at 524.
119. Hayton & Utton, supra note 21, at 684-85. "[T]he Parties may already have a
joint international institution whose powers and functions may readily be expanded to
deal with the added responsibilities of transnational groundwater. If no such institution is in place, or the Parties choose to create a separate commission or agency, the
name to be given the new entity is, similarly, to be inserted in Paragraph 1. In the case
of the United States and Mexico, it is likely that the Parties would choose to designate
their existing International Boundary and Water Commission, with which the Governments have a long and satisfactory experience." Id.
120. Id at 684.
121- So",
HA-VTON sura note 39, at 244-45.
122. See id.at 242-44.
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or other types of state cooperation could be of significant contribution
to the codification and progressive development of international law
relating to the use of shared transboundary groundwaters.'
In the absence of formal treaties, there is an emerging trend to establish technical, informal and non-binding networks and cooperative
frameworks. Such arrangements rely primarily on the morals and ethics of states and their recognition of the need for such cooperation.
B. STATE PRACTICE IN AFRICA EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

By and large, the treaty survey demonstrates that states appear
rarely to devote special attention to the regulation of their transboundary groundwater. If states include it within the scope of international arrangements, they evidently treated groundwater resources
similarly to surface water. The increased knowledge and awareness of
the special characteristics and behaviours of groundwater have not yet
triggered the formulation of international treaties that specifically
regulate the utilization, development and protection of these resources. This survey also reveals that only "connected" transboundary
groundwater is included within the scope of the existing treaties. Confined transboundary aquifers remain formally unregulated.
In Africa, where the water situation is not uniform across the country, state practices relating to transboundary groundwater vary. Generally, connected transboundary groundwater falls within the scope of
international watercourse treaties. The adoption of the Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the Southern African Development
Community ("SADC") in 2000 clearly signified this region's position
on the importance of transboundary groundwater ' , yet the protocol
treated it as surface water. As for Europe, recent treaties related to
international watercourses increasingly recognised groundwater as an
integral component of the whole water system. Accordingly, the integrated ecosystem approach to the management of these resources is

123. See SECOND WORLD WATER FORUM, MINISTERIAL DECLARATION OF THE HAGUE ON
at
(Mar.
22,
2000),
21ST
CENTURY
SECURITY
IN
THE
WATER
http://www.waterunc.coin/bg/secwwfl2.htrn (drawing attention to the problems of
managing shared water resources to promote peaceful co-operation and develop synergies between "different users of water at all levels." The promotion of peaceful resolution includes co-operation between adjacent states in the case of shared groundwater
resources).
124.
Southern African Development Community: Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses , Aug. 7, 2000, pmbl. (replacing the Protocol that entered into force on
Sept. 29 1998), [hereinafter SADC Protocol],
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/law/iwlri/Documents/Treaties/Multilateral%20Treaties/2
000%20Revised%20SADC%20Protocol.pdf (last visited Apr. 2003).
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becoming common." Although transboundary groundwater still requires a more specific response, the guidance that some of the UNECE
multilateral conventions offered, such as the 1992 Helsinki Convention, ' the 1994 Danube,' 2' the 1998 Rhine Convention," is satisfactory.
Additionally, the European Union Water Framework Directive
("WFD") is considered the most advanced instrument in addressing
water resources management in an integrated manner. ' In the Middle East although groundwater constitutes a major water supply source,
many of the aquifers shared by two States or more lack regulation."
Apart from the recent agreements signed between Israel and its
neighbours, Palestine and Jordan, which merely serve political pur-

125. See United Nations: Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and International Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M 1312, 1315 [hereinafter
1992 Helsinki Conventioni.
126. Id.
127. See 1994 Danube Convention, supra note 43, art. 6. The Danube River Basin is
in the heartland of Central Europe, The main river is 2,850 km long and drains
800,000 km 2 including all of Hungary; most part of Romania, Austria, Slovenia, Croatia
and Slovakia; and significant parts of Bulgaria, Germany, the Czech Republic, Moldova
and Ukraine. Territories of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and small parts of Italy, Switzerland, Albania and Poland are also included in the
basin. See RIVERNET, THE DANUBE, at http://www.rivernet.org/danube/basic.htm (last
visited Nov. 12, 2004); REc'L ENVTL. CTR. FOR CENT. AND E. EUROPE, DANUBE COUNTRIES,
at http://www.rec.org/DanubePCU/maps/countries.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2004).
128. Convention on the Protection of the Rhine, Jan. 22, 1998, art. 2 (hereinafter
1998 Rhine Convention],
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/RegionalDocs/Rhine-_Riverhtm (last visited
May 2003). The river Rhine flows from its source in Switzerland through Germany,
France and the Netherlands to the North Sea. It is the third largest river in Europe.
The total length is 1,320 km and the catchment area is 185,000 km . EvA-MARlA
LEVERMANN, GOETHE INST., CLEANING UP 'FATHER RHINE' (Oct. 2003), at
http://ww.goethe.de/kug/ges/umw/thm/en62916.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2004).
The average discharge is 2,300 m per second and total volume per year is in average
70 km'. ANTON EARLE, THE WATER PAGE, THE RHINE RIVER (Sept. 2001), at
http://www.thewaterpage.com/rhine-main.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2004). At present,
more than 50 million people live in the catchment in 9 countries, Switzerland, Austria,
Liechtenstein, Italy, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands. Id.;
LEFRMAN-, supra. It provides the source for drinking-water production for more than
20 million people. EUROPEAN COMM'N, EUROPEAN CATCHMENTS: CATCIIMENI CHANGES
AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE COAST (EUROCAT), REBCAT: THE RHINE RIVER CATCHMENT,
at http://ww.iia-cnr.unical.it/EUROCAT/Rhine%20inglese.htm (last visited Dec. 1,
2004). The Convention stresses some principles mainly derived from international
environmental law, such as the procedural principles that guide the implementation of
the Convention, are the prevention principle, the precautionary principle, and the
principle of polluter pays. 1998 Rhine Convention, art. 4 (a)-(b), (c).
129. Council Directive 2000/60/EC on Establishing a Framework for Community
Action in the Field of Water Policy, art. 1, 2000 O.J. (L. 327) 1, 5, available at
http://www.bmu.de/files/water-framework-directive.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2004).
130. See HAYrON, supra note 39, at 242.
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poses, no formal arrangement governs transboundary groundwaters in
the region.'"'
As for the substantive rules, it appears the principle of territorial
sovereignty is well founded in state practice. From this researcher's
perspective, this reflects the correlative rights of states under the equitable and reasonable utilization principle. In Africa, the balance between equitable and reasonable utilization and the obligation not to
cause harm has explicitly favoured the equitable and reasonable principle, as the 1990 Niger -Nigeria Agreement' and the Revised SADC
In Europe, the equitable and reasonable
Protocol demonstrated.'
utilization principle emerged after the 1990's. Prior to that time, the
focus was on transboundary impact and the obligation to limit such an
impact. In the Middle East, the few examples reviewed illustrate a
unique mode of cooperation due to the tense political situation. The
region's agreements appear to emphasize the "no harm" principle,
while leaving the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization almost completely absent.
The reviewed state treaty practice in the three selected regions provides some common denominators on procedural rules, at the heart of
which lies cooperation.'" State treaty practice also includes a range of
mechanisms to successfully implement and achieve the desired cooperation. These mechanisms include the duty to exchange information,
prior notification and consultation. Consultation, as referred to in the
various legal arrangements, is dependent on general principles of international law including good faith, neighbourliness and reciprocity.
In Europe, existing treaties provide significant guidance for the progressive development of the law relating to transboundary groundwater. The concepts of protection or restricted zones, the joint monitoring and control on abstraction, human activity and pollution constitute
innovative solutions that can be borrowed and adapted to suit the local
conditions. The "precautionary" and "preventive" approaches that are
common to most of the legal instruments address the most critical
problem associated with groundwater, the irreversibility of damages
and losses. These approaches are integral to attain efficient and optimum protection of transboundary groundwater.
131.
See, e.g., id. at 239.
132. Agreement Between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and The Republic of Niger Concerning the Equitable Sharing in the Development, Conservation and Use of
Their Common Water Resources, July 18, 1990, art. 2, 5 [hereinafter 1990 NigerNigeria Agreement], http://www.fao.org/docrep/W7414B/w7414bl0.htm (last visited
Dec. 1, 2004).
133. SADC Protocol, supra note 124, art. 2(b).
134. See, e.g., id. at pmbl. para. 4, art. 2; 1994 Danube Convention, supra note 43, at
pmbl. para. 1, 4, art. 2(2), 4; Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
Sept. 28, 1995, Isr.-P.L.O., ch. 4, sched. 8, 36 I.L.M. 551, 566-67, 632 [hereinafter IsraelP.L.O. Interim Agreement] (demonstrating mechanisms to facilitate cooperation).

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 8

Most of the legal instruments and agreements analyzed for this
study recognize the need for an appropriate institutional mechanism
for the implementation of cooperation. To that end, states in the
three selected regions resorted to different types of institutional
mechanisms. Such mechanisms are classified into four main categoies, (i) establishing mechanisms for regular meetings between the
parties, (ii) making use of existing institutions, (iii) establishing new
institutions, and (iv) encouraging the set up of proper mechanisms.
The powers, structure and scope of work of such institutions range
from one instrument to another. While some institutions have purely
technical and supervisory functions, others have complete authority
over the decision-making with regard to the implementation of the
legal arrangement." Additionally, some of the legal instruments employ existing institutional mechanisms as the first resort for dispute
settlement.' 7 For disputes that are not resolved by the respective institutional mechanisms the legal instruments most often offer a choice of
one or a combination of three stepwise mechanisms for dispute settle-.
ment, mediation, conciliation and arbitration.

135. See, e.g., Treaty Between the Hungarian People's Republic and the Republic of
Austria Concerning the Regulation of Water Economy Questions in The Frontier Region, Apr. 9, 1956, art. 12-13 (entered into force on July 31, 1956) (establishing ajoint
technical committee),
http://ocid.nacse.org/qml/research/tfdd/toTFDDdocs/94ENG.htm (last visited Oct.
24, 2004); Israel-P.L.O. Interim Agreement, supra note 134, sched. 8-9, 632-33 (establishing ajoint supervisory committee).
136. See, e.g., Treaty Between Germany and Poland for the Settlement of Frontier
Questions,Jan. 27, 1926, art. 39 (establishing a Boundary Commission with the power
to make decisions binding both parties),
http://ocid.nacse.org/qml/research/tfdd/toTFDDdocs/35ENG.htmn (last visited Oct.
24, 2004); Protocol to Establish a Tripartite Standing Committee on Polluted Waters,
Apr. 8, 1950, Belg.-Fr.-Lux. (establishing a Tripartite Standing Committee with the
power to determine legal responsibilities of member states),
http://ocid.nacse.org/qml/research/tfdd/toTFDDdocs/284ENG.pdf (last visited Oct.
24, 2004); Convention Creating the Niger Basin Authority, Nov. 21, 1980, art. 4 (establishing an authority with the power to design and implement policies regarding surface
and groundwater use), ocid.nacse.org/qml/research/tfdd/toTDDdocs/374ENG.htm
(last visited Oct. 24, 2004); 1992 Helsinki Convention, supra note 125, at 1319-20 (providing for the establishment ofjoint bodies with the authority to establish emissions
limits, water quality objectives and action programs).
137. See, e.g., Convention and Statutes Relating to the Development of the Chad
Basin, May 22, 1964, art. 9(g) [hereinafter the 1964 Chad Convention],
http://www.fao.org/Legal/treaties/treaty-e.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2004) (establishing the Chad Basin Commission with the authority to examine complaints and assist in
settling disputes); 1990 Niger-Nigeria Agreement, supra note 132, art. 17 (requiring
referral of differences in interpretation of the Agreement, or equitable sharing determinations "to the Nigeria-NigerJoint Commission for Co-operation").
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C. INFORMAL STATES' COOPERATION

In the absence of formal treaties, there is also an emerging trend to
establish informal and technical networks and cooperative frameworks.
In Africa, the latter trend is primarily observed in the context of transboundary confined groundwaters, a highly valuable resource no legally
binding arrangement regulates." In Europe, however, these cooperative frameworks are emerging in the field of unregulated, connected
transboundary groundwater. Europe increasingly realizes the need to
build knowledge and awareness about their shared transboundary
groundwaters, but not in the form of a binding treaty yet."3 9 As for the
138. In Africa the cooperative frameworks have been established for the Nubian
Sandstone Aquifer System ("NSAS"), which is a huge confined aquifer, located in the
eastern Sahara desert in northeastern Africa. CEDARE, NUBIAN SANDSTONE AQUIFER
PROGRAMME, at http://www.cedare.org.eg/nubian/ (last updated-Oct. 14, 2004);
CEDARE, NUBIAN SANDSTONE AQUIFER, NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, at

http://www.cedare.org.eg/nubian/project/National-inst.htm (last visited Dec. 1,
2004). In the 1970's, the States sharing the (NSAS) expressed their interest in regional
cooperation to share experience and to study and develop this regional aquifer. The
recent initiative to formulate a regional strategy for the utilization of the NSAS is a step
towards the sustainable management of the aquifer, through the sharing of information, monitoring of the aquifer and the exchange of updated information on the behaviour of that shared resources. See CEDARE, NUBIAN SANDSTONE AQUIFER
PROGRAMME, ACHIEVEMENTS, at
http://www.cedare.org.eg/nubian/project/activities.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2004).
The four States sharing the NSAS have signed two agreements: one instrument related
to the sharing of data incorporated in the regional information system. CEDARE,
NUBIAN SANDSTONE AQUIFER PROGRAMME, REGIONAL COOPERATION, at

http://www.cedare.org.eg/nubian/project/regionaLcoop.htm

(last visited Dec. 1,

2004). The second agreement updated this information by continuous monitoring of
the aquifer. Id The most important achievement of these agreements was the revitalization of the Joint Authority on the NSAS "that was previously formed between Egypt,
Libya, and later Sudan." CEDARE, NUBIAN SANDSIlONE AQUIFER PROGRAMME,
ACHIEVEMFNTS, at http://www.cedare.org.eg/nubian/project/activities.htrn (last visited Dec. 1, 2004). "Chad was invited to attend as an observer at the first meeting (during the project) of the revitalized joint Authority in February 1998. TheJoint Authority acted as the Regional Programme Steering Committee (RPSC)." Id. Currently the
efforts are concentrated on "[d]eveloping a regional mathematical model for simulating scenarios for the utilisation of the NSAS, hence developing the regional strategy
for the sustainable management of the aquifer. Id. Another example of cooperative
framework is the one on the North Western Sahara Aquifer System shared by Libya,
Tunisia and Algeria. INT'L RIVER BASINS OF AFRICA, VULNERABIULIY OF WATER RESOURCES
TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN AFRICA: A RIVER BASIN APPROACH (Nov. 2003),
http://www.unep.org/dewa/water/vulnerability/Assets/Report_- NA.pdf (last visited
Dec. 1, 2004); U.N. FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORG., LEGAL OFFICE: LEGAL ADVISORY
SERVICES, WATER NEWS, at http://www.fao.org/Legal/advserv/waternews.htm (last
visited Dec. 1, 2004). The increased utilization of the North-Western Sahara Aquifer
System (NWSAS) since 1982 led to this system being identified as a high national priority.
A good example of cooperation occurs on the Vechte catchment area between
139.
the Netherlands and Germany. See NETHERLANDS INST. OF APPLIED GEOSCIENCE, REGIS
PROJECTS - TRANSBOUNDARYAPPLICATION VECHTE, at
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Middle East, some have made efforts to bring the Israeli, Palestinians
and Jordanians into a semi-informal form of cooperation. " Especially
in countries where the transboundary water resources are highly disputed, such as in Israel, Jordan and Palestine, informal regional cooperation is more viable and preferable because the current prospects for
concluding obligatory commitments related to the shared transboundary groundwaters are limited. To that end, the next sections draws
lessons from the research undertaken so far and proposes the most
viable approach for solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict over transboundary groundwater resources.
4
V. THE MOUNTAIN AQUIFER"
CASE STUDY

A. DESCRIPTION

The Mountain Aquifer system, shared between Israel and Palestine,
consists of three sub-aquifers: the Northeastern Mountain Aquifer Basin ("NEMAB")", the Western Mountain Aquifer Basin ("WMAB") 43
http://www.envidat.de/REGIS_demo/Home.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2004). On the
initiative of the German and Dutch water management authorities the Regional Geohydrological Information System (REGIS) is being applied to the River Vechte crossborder basin. Id. In Europe, the system REGIS-Vechte has been developed in the
framework of the Digital Waterway Vechte project with participation by water managers from both Germany and the Netherlands. Id.
140. In the context of the Middle East Peace process a Group on Water Resources
was established. ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES FOR

COOPERATION
ON
WATER,
Feb.
13,
1996,
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%2OPr
ocess/Declaration%20on%2OPrinciples%20for%2OCooperation%20on%2OWater (last
visited Dec. 1, 2004). This group had four broad agenda items to address some of the
critical water issues, which include the enhancement of water data availability, water
management practices, including conservation, enhancement of water supply and
concepts of regional water management and cooperation. See id. As an outcome of
these efforts, "facilitated by the Government of Norway and the Office of Gavelholder,"
the core parties "have identified common denominators in their water resources management systems and proclaimed [a] 'Declaration on Principles for Cooperation'." Id.
These common denominators water include: (i) water legislations, which "apply to all
types of water resources including wastewater and desalinated water;" (ii) ownership
and administration of water resources, which "are publicly owned and/or centrally
controlled. They are used for the benefit of their respective societies." Id. "[T]he
Core Parties in the Middle East Peace Process are considered to be Jordan, [S]yria,
Israel, Lebanon and the PLO for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority..." Id. The
signatories of the Declaration were Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and the PLO. Id.
The Core Parties confirmed that "this Declaration ... will not affect or alter in any form
or manner ... the bilateral or other agreements or undertakings among them, nor does
it prohibit or constrain any bilateral arrangements, understandings or agreements
aimed at enhancing cooperation in water-related matters. Id.
141. The Mountain Aquifer is considered a "connected aquifer," shared by Israel
and Palestine. See Barberis, supra note 14, at 168.
142. The NEMAB covers the areas of Nablus and Jenin in the West Bank and the
waters flows northwards to their major outlets in Bet Sha'an Springs in Northern Israel.
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and the Eastern Mountain Aquifer Basin ("EMAB").' The former two
aquifers form part of an international hydrologic system that is shared
with Israel. 4 Recharge originating in the West Bank highlands feeds
the EMAB, which lies almost entirely within the West Bank. ' According to the Barberis classification of transboundary

aquifers,14 7 the

EMAB is part of an international hydrological system, namely the Jordan River Basin, because it is effluent to the Jordan River Basin in that
it lies in the upstream of the rivers and feeds into the river. The treatment of the EMAB is beyond the scope of this study. By and large, any
future consideration of the whole Jordan River Basin must take into
account the relationship between the EMAB utilization and development, and that of the Jordan River Basin. "'
WALID SABBAIH &JAD ISAAC, APPLIED RESEARCH INST.-JFRUSALEM, TOWARDS A PALESTINIAN

WATER POLICY (1995),
http://www.arij.org/pub/Towards%20a%2OPalestinian%20Water%2OPolicy.pdf (last
2
visited Dec. 1, 2004). The feeding and storage area of 700 km lies almost completely
2
in the West Bank (650 km ). SeeALLOCATIONS OF WATER AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN AN
ISILELI-PALESTINIAN WATER ACCORD, GEOGRAPHY OF WATER RESOURCES [hereinafter
GEOGRAPHY OF WATER RESOURCES], at
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/-wws40lc/geography.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2004).
The NEMAB starts near Nablus (Schem) and flows towards the Gilboa Mountains and
Jezreal and Bet Shean Valleys to the northeast. SABBAH & ISAAC, supra. The Interim
Agreement between the PLO and Israel estimated that the recharge of the NEMAB was
said to yield 145 mcm/yr. GEOGRAPHY OF WATER RESOURCES, supra. See also map 1,
infra.
143. The WMAB, referred to as the Yarkon Tanninim in Israel, is located in the
Western part of the West Bank. SABBAH & ISAAC, supra note 142. The recharge area is
1800 km of which 1400 km' lies in the West Bank. Most of the storage area of 2500
km' lies in Israel. Id. Two major natural outlets are Rash El Ein (in Israel Rosh
Ha'ayn) and Tamasech Springs. WMAB is estimated to have a recharge of 362
mcm/yr. GEOGRAPHY OF WATER RESOURCES, supra note 142.
144. The EMAB is located and recharged entirely in the West Bank, with the feeding
2
and storage area spread over 2200 km . See SABBAH & ISAAC, supra note 142. The Interim Agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority estimated that recharge
of the is EMAB 172 mcm/yr. GEOGRAPHY OF WATER RESOURCES, supra note 142.
145. According to the classification of transboundary aquifers made by Barberis, this
statement is true because the two aquifers (NEMAB and WMAB) are each divided by
an international border. Barberis, supra note 14, at 168.
146. Hillel Shuval, Towards Resolving Conflicti Over Water Between Israel and Its
Neighbours: The Israeli-PalestinianShared Use of the Mountain Aquifer as a Case Study, in
WATER, PEACE AND THE MIDDLE EAST: NEGOTIATING RESOURCES IN THEJORDAN BASIN

137,

141 (J.A. Allan ed., 1996).
147. Barberis, supra note 14, at 168.
148. Many efforts to resolve the conflict over the waters of the Jordan River Basin the
latest of which was the Johnston Plan, an allocation scheme proposed in 1953 by
United States special envoy to the Middle East, Ambassador Eric Johnston. AARON
WOLF, HYDROPOLITICS ALONG THE JORDAN RIVER: SCARCE WATER AND ITS IMPACT ON THE

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT ch. 2 (1995),
http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80859e/80859EOO.htm#Contents (last
visited Dec. 1, 2004). The plan was the product of negotiations with representatives of
Israel, Lebanon, Syria andJordan that led in 1955 to a unified plan for all the ripari-
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Map 1: Transboundary
Aquifers
Groundwater
Shared between Israel
and Palestine

ans. Id. The plan was never adopted or ratified partly because the Arab states (especially Jordan) did not need a comprehensive water development program that directly
involved Israel to achieve their immediate development goals, and because the Arabs
did not agree to the criteria that were used for dividing the shares among the parties.
Id.
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B. HYDRO-POLITIcAL BACKGROUND

Since occupying the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip as a
result of the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel has constantly refused to relinquish control of any of the occupied territory."9 Hostilities.and conflicts arising over the utilization and development of the Mountain
Aquifer shared between Israel and Palestine make this resource one of

the most contentious in the Middle East region and explain why it is
the subject of this case study. From 19 6 7 " to 1995,' ' Israeli legislation
and military orders have governed the Palestinian use of transbound-

ary groundwater. ' Since 1967, Israel has denied the Palestinians access to the only major international surface watercourse, the Jordan

River. Accordingly, groundwater in Palestine, most of which is transboundary with Israel, constitutes the major source of supply for all
uses. For many years, this practice has violated the rights of people to
equitable and fair utilization of the shared water resources. Such a

violation is contrary to the spirit and principles of customary international law and is one of the major obstacles to cooperation and the
achievement of peace between Palestinians and Israelis.

149. Mustafa Mar'i, Permanent Status Negotiations in the Palestinian - Israeli Context: A Case for International Intervention (1995/6) (unpublished LLM thesis,
Queen's University-Belfast) (on file with University of Denver Water Law Review),
http://firms.findlaw.com/MariLaw/memo9.htm. (last visited Dec. 1, 2004).
150. Israel took control of "the recharge areas for [the Mountain Aquifer] that
flow[s] west and northwest into Israel (at about 320 MCM/yr and 140 MCM/yr, respectively) and east to the Jordan Valley (about 125 MCM/yr). The entire renewable recharge of these first two aquifers is already being exploited by Israel and the recharge
of the third is close to being depleted as well." WOLF, supra note 148 (citations omitted).
151.
In September 1995, Israel signed an agreement with the Palestinian Liberation
Organization ("P.L.O.") regarding the interim arrangement on the West Bank and
Gaza Strip allocating 70-80 MCM of additional water for the Palestinians. Israel-P.L.O.
Interim Agreement, supra note 134, at 625, art. 40(6).
152.

STEFAN DECONINCK, COMMENT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE IPCRI WORKING GROUP

FORUM
OF PALESTINIAN
AND
ISRAELI
PARLIAMENTARIANS
(Aug.
27,1998),
http://waternet.rug.ac.be/shortage/commentIPCRIl.htm (last updated Oct. 1, 2004).
Prior 1967, Jordan issued rules and regulations governing the use, development and
other water related matters. These laws remained in effect even after the 5 June 1967,
when an Israeli proclamation stated that water use and development could be subject
to changes introduced by the Military Commander. After 1967, Israel issued successive
Military Orders to amend parts of these laws. Id. Military Orders relevant to this discussion include: Military Order 92 issued August 15, 1967 (transferring authority of
West Bank water resources to the military commander); Military Order 158 issued Nov.
19, 1967 (requiring a license issued by a military commander appointed functionary
for the construction of new water infrastructure); Military Order 291 issued Dec. 19,
1968 (confiscating water resources, and making them public property under the Israeli
Water Law of 1959 for use in Israel's development). Id. See also WOLF, supra note 148,
at ch. 2; WORLD FOUND. FOR ENV'T AND DEV. (WFED), WATER INSTITUTIONS AND WATER
LAWS IN PALESTINE (GAZA STRIP AND THE WEST BANK) (1995) (on file with author).
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After many long years of conflict, the Palestinians and Israelis
started formal negotiations in 1992. The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations within the current Middle East peace process was, among
other things, to establish a Palestinian interim self-autonomy not to
exceed three years, and leading to a permanent settlement to be based
on the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.'
The unequal balance of power between the disputants characterized
the negotiations. A major barrier was that Israel, with superior power
in every respect, did not recognize the Palestinians' right to an independent existence, nor did it acknowledge Palestinian national aspirations. The peace process established water arrangements that were
politically sensitive, which is one explanation for their complete failure
to address the needs of the population under the stressed political
situation. Other reasons for this failure included the asymmetric technical, political, and financial levels of the two parties. Above all, the
heart of the problem was the fact that the negotiations did not address
the issue of equal legal entitlements between the parties. Israel continues to exercise full control over all the water resources, including
those transboundary groundwaters shared with the Palestinians. The
interim period only offered temporary solutions for the water crises in
Palestine. To date, the parties have only made minimal progress in
fulfilling the promised commitments."' This presents the challenge of
153. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13,
1993, Isr.-P.L.O., pmbl., art. I, 32 I.L.M. 1525, 1527 (entered into force Oct. 13, 1993)
[hereinafter Israel-P.L.O. Declaration of Principles]. The United Nations Security
Council Resolution 242 is a binding Security Council resolution, which contains two
main componcnts: "1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the
establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the
application of both the following principles: (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from
territories occupied in the recent conflict; (ii) Termination of all claims or states of
belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in
peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 2.
Affirms further the necessity: (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through
international waterways in the area; (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee
problem; (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence
of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones." U.N. SCOR, 1382d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (1967), available at
http://ods-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/240/94/IMG/NRO24094.pdf?OpenEleme
nt (last visited Dec. 1, 2004). Resolution 338 followed the Yom Kippur war of 1973,
and called on both sides to begin implementation of Resolution 242. U.N. SCOR,
1747th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/337, available at http://ods-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/288/65/MG/NRO28865.pdpOpenEleme
nt (last visited Dec. 1, 2004).
154. See generally Israel-P.L.O. Declaration of Principles, supra note 153 (describing
obligations of Israel and P.L.O. to end conflict within a five year period); Agreement
on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, Isr.-P.L.O. 33 I.L.M. 622, 626
(1994) (describing the obligations of Israel and the P.L.O. and recognizing that the
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how these two parties could negotiate an agreement irrespective of
their unequal bargaining power by trusting that ethical considerations
and good faith can play a role.
Most recently, Israelis and Palestinians informally signed the Geneva Accord, which called for the establishment of the Palestinian
State and an end to the era of hostility and conflict."' The Accord,
which was launched in Switzerland on December 1, 2003, was considered a Framework Agreement that the parties would negotiate and
further elaborate upon in order to implement the "road map." The
Geneva Accord did not include details on the principles governing the
utilization and development of transboundary groundwaters.1" This
deficiency was quite serious because it left open all Israeli claims to the
region's water resources, natural wealth, and airspace. The text made
several references to annexes, but these issues have, in effect, been
deferred, and may become the "final status" issues of the Geneva understanding. Nevertheless, the Accord recognized the sovereignty of
the proposed Palestinian State over territorial in accordance with the
United Nations Charter and international law."7
C. THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI WATER CONFLICT: CURRENT ISSUES,
CONCERNS AND CHALLENGES

This article raises many issues, concerns and challenges associated
with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict over the Mountain Aquifer. On the
one hand, if properly managed, these challenges are opportunities.
On the other hand, if neglected and renounced, these same challenges
might impede all efforts towards the achievement of an arrangement
concerning the Mountain Aquifer. Therefore, any proposal or attempt
for resolving the present water conflict must adequately and appropriately respond to the special requirements of these challenges. The
following sections deal with this part of the analysis.
provisions of the Declaration of Principles calling for Israeli troop withdrawal had not
yet been met).
155. The Geneva Peace Accord, Oct. 2003, Isr.-P.L.O., pmbl., art. 2 [hereinafter
2003 Geneva Accord], http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/genevaO3.htm
(last
visited Dec. 2003). This is an unofficial peace treaty, which was drafted by a group of
Israelis and Palestinians and issued in October 2003. Those involved included former
Israeli Justice Minister Yossi Beilin and former Palestinian Information Minister Yasser
Abed Rabbo. Id, The Swiss government provided financial backing for the project,
also had support from former U.S. presidentJimmy Carter. Id.
156. Id. art. 12. Article 12 of the 2003 Geneva Accord has yet to be completed. rd.
The text makes several references to annexes, but, in the opinion of this researcher,
these issues should have been addressed promptly and clearly in the document.
157. Id. art. 4 (2) (providing: "2. Sovereignty and Inviolability (a) The Parties recognize and respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, as well as the inviolability of each others territory, including territorial waters,
and airspace. They shall respect this inviolability in accordance with this Agreement,
the UN Charter, and other rules of international law.").

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 8

1. Asymmetry Among the Parties
Asymmetry appears to be in the favour of Israel, and it exists at
many levels and many different forms. The first level of asymmetry
concerns the utilization of waters from the Mountain Aquifer. Whilst
around 3 million Palestinians have access to 16% of the Mountain Aquifer's renewable waters, Israel has control over the remaining 84% of
these waters, in addition to all of the other surface and groundwater
resources available for its use. The challenge is how to achieve an equitable, mutually beneficial arrangement for both parties, despite the
fact that they are competing over a fixed resource and have unequal
power structures.
In addition, asymmetry of information and knowledge regarding
transboundary groundwater resources is another important problem.
At the one end, there is an abundance of data and information on the
Israeli side, and at the other, a paucity of data and information on the
Palestinian side. By and large, the Palestinians were and still are recipients of data from the various Israeli or international organizations
because of the unilateral control over research and development in the
field of hydrology water resources development. This fact is serious
and would require prodigious efforts in order to verify existing information and establish national Palestinian figures and statistics."
The third level of asymmetry concerns the parties' interests in resolving the conflict. Israel, being the powerful party, does not appear
to envision the benefits from achieving an equitable and reasonable
solution based on the rules of international law. Additionally, the Palestinians have so far failed to building confidence with Israeli politicians and negotiators concerning their intentions towards the shared
transboundary groundwater resources. The challenge is how to reach
a balance between the parties' interests at the table of negotiations to
ensure they pursue equitable solutions.
Water infrastructure and services development is far less industrialized in the Palestine Territories than in Israel. After the establishment
of the Palestinian Authority ("PA"), and especially after the take over
by the Palestinian Water Authority, many projects have been implemented to construct new water networks or to rehabilitate existing
ones. This is a time consuming task that requires commitments from
the Palestinians and Israelis, as well as the support of the international
community.
2. The Israeli Position
The Israeli position not to give up a drop of its existing uses and its
persistent arguments concerning the need to develop new and addi158.

PALESTINIAN WATER AUTHORIYARCHIVES (2000) (on file with author).
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tional water resources, including desalinated water and reused wastewater, need serious reconsideration."
3. Resistance to International Law
To date, international law has had a limited role in resolving the
water conflict between Israel and Palestine."u The existing inequitable
utilization of the international watercourses, including transboundary
groundwater, has been considered defacto as establishing water rights,
and the "no harm" rule appears to be the overarching principle embraced by at least the Israeli negotiators. From this researcher's perspective, Israel is unlikely to accept a binding agreement related to
transboundary groundwater based on international law. This explains
Israel's hesitance to conclude the water issue under the 1995 IsraeliPalestinian Interim Agreement.' 1
There are three main reasons for Israel's resistance to conclude a
legally binding agreement on the Mountain Aquifer: (i) Israel's great
dependence on its waters, (ii) Israel's undeclared recognition that
their current utilization of the shared groundwater resources violates
principles and rules of international water law, and (iii) any future legal arrangement that builds on the rules and principles of international law and relevant best practices threatens Israel's absolute control
over the shared groundwaters. 62' As for tie Palestinians, it is believed
by this researcher that they have accepted the Interim Agreement arrangement on water for two main reasons: first, given the transitional
nature of these arrangements the Palestinians anticipated that the final
status negotiations would bring equitable solutions for them; second,
the Interim Agreement is the only official document whereby Israel
recognized the Palestinian water rights, which they hoped was the real
first step towards cooperation and agreement over water rights."u In
reality, the signed agreements did not provide an adequate framework

159. This argument is based on the Israeli statements and official positions regarding the issue of water. Recently, some joint Israeli Palestinian studies supported this
argument, like the Regional Water Supply and Development Study funded by the
German Government under the multilateral peace talks on water in 1998. ISRAEL
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE WATER RESOURcES WORKING GROUP (Oct. 20, 2002),
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/peace%20process/guide%20to%20the%20peace%20proc
ess/water%20resources%20working%20group (last visited Dec. 1, 2004).
160. See generally Burchi, supra note 5 (providing an overview and analysis of the
shortcomings in international groundwater laws).
161. See Israel-P.L.O Interim Agreement, supra note 134, at 625, art. 40(1).
162.
Contra id. at 625-27, art. 40 (listing both Israel's obligations under the agreement, which have not been fulfilled).
163. This view is based on the researcher's six years (1995-2000) of experience with
the Palestinian Water Authority. Additionally, the researcher worked on the preparation of the technical files for the negotiations as well as preparing documents and files
for the Joint Technical Water Committee.
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to regulate these parties' relationship with regard to the Mountain Aquifer. The next section further elaborates on the question of whether
or not, in the context of the Mountain Aquifer, the signed treaties resulted in mutual benefits to the parties.
4. Relevance of Signed Agreements: A Mutual Benefit?
The relevant regional treaties' obligation to cooperate appears to
serve mainly the objectives of the Israelis, namely protecting their existing uses. The Interim Agreement of 1995 provided only a temporary
solution for this eternally complicated conflict.' The agreement emphasized the Israeli recognition of Palestinian water rights in the West
Bank, but gave no definitions of these rights."' Only Article 40 allocated additional supplies to serve the urgent water needs for the Palestinians; the Eastern Aquifer Basin and any other agreed sources were
the sources for these supplies."u Furthermore, there was no agreement
on what overarching legal principles would govern the rights and obligations of both parties. The negotiations of these rights were postponed for the permanent status negotiations. According to the Interim Agreement these talks should have commenced in 1998, three
years after the signing. However, the unstable political environment
within the region has hindered the beginning of any serious negotiations on water.' 7 A comparison between the agreement and what the
parts have actually achieved strongly indicates that the complexity of
the situation and the inequality of the power structures of the two parties favour the Israelis. The existing joint mechanisms and institutions,
164.

See Israel-P.L.O. Interim Agreement, supra note 134, at 558, pmbl.

165.

Id at 625, art. 40, para. I (stating: "Israel recognizes the Palestinian Water

rights in the West Bank. These will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations

and settled in the Permanent Status Agreement relating to the various water resources.").
166. Id. at 625-26, art. 40, para. 6-7. (stating: "Both sides have agreed that the future
needs of the Palestinians in the West Bank are estimated between 70-80 mcm/yr."). Of
the 70-80 mcm/yr provided to the Palestinians, only 28.6 mcm/yr were considered
urgent, and a plan for development was included in Article 40, paragraph 7. Id. para.
7(a)-(b). "The remainder of the estimated quantity of the Palestinian needs mentioned in paragraph 6 above, over the quantities mentioned in this paragraph (41.451.4 mcm/year) shall be developed by the Palestinians from the Eastern Aquifer and
other agreed sources in the West Bank." Id. at 626, para. 7(b) (6).

167.

Israel-P.L.O. Declaration of Principles, supra note 153, at 1527, art. I. The Dec-

laration states: "[t]he aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current
Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim
Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the "Council"), for the Palestinian
people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding
five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions

242 and 338." Id. In the field of water, the Declaration included commitment from
both sides to cooperate in the field of water and the protection of the environment
including the initiation of studies and research to strengthen this cooperation. Id. at
1537, annex II.
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especially the Joint Water Committee, completely failed to fulfil its obligations. On a technical level, the projects essential for development
were delayed, rejected or put on hold due to unjustified reasons."
5. Lack of Cooperation and Coordination
So far, there has been no coordination between Israel and Palestine on transboundary groundwater resources because the magnitude
of the problem has outpaced efforts for comprehensive management.
In effect, during the period of occupation the Palestinians have had
limited, if any, control over these resources. Any further delays in taking serious steps towards genuine cooperation will further deteriorate
the water situation and inflate the water crises, causing harm to both
the present and future generations and to the groundwater resources.
The current situation of non-cooperation has only increased the gap
between the parties, and deepened the mistrust in all matters and at all
levels. The continuation of the status quo in relation to the imbalance
of utilization and uncoordinated management of transboundary
groundwater are not in the best interests of either party.
6. Palestine's Water Institutions and Good Governance
The newly established Palestinian Water Authority ("PWA")75 has
the authority to regulate and manage all Palestinian water resources,
including transboundary water resources.'7" The PWA will not fully
achieve its mandate unless the sovereign rights of the Palestinians over
the transboundary groundwaters are respected and recognized.' 7 ' The
PWA faces many obstacles to rehabilitate, build and operate new systems and structures. There is an immense need for investment in water. If Palestine and Israel built water institutions together with the
required infrastructure, they could reap the benefits of huge investments. This need calls for a genuine commitment from the international community and Israel to help establish strong institutions of
168. See Meetings of the Joint Water Committee ('JWC") (1996-1998) (unpublished
meeting minutes) (on file with author).
169. The Palestinian Water Authority was established by the Presidential Order
Number 90 in 1995. IHAB BARGHOTHI, HOUSE COMM. ON INT'L RELATIONS, PALESTINIAN

WATER AuTHORIiY 2 (May 5, 2004),
http://wwwc.house.gov/international-relations/108/bar050504.pdf (last visited Dec.
1,2004).
170. The Palestinian National Authority established the Palestinian Water Authority,
as a statutory institution with its own budget, and under the authority of the Palestinian
Cabinet of Ministers. Id. at 5-6.
171. Because the water problem was delayed until permanent status negotiations
took place, Israel continues to maintain control over all of the water resources in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. PWA decisions, even within the Palestinian Territories, to
develop new water resources are dependent on decisions taken by the Israeli Authorities.
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comparable capacities to those in Israel in order to pave the way for
cooperation. Although the parties were actually expected to start cooperating in 1993, 1994 and 1995 when they signed three consecutive
formal legal arrangements,' the present emphasis on positions rather
than interests from both sides continues to intensify the problem and
amplify the complexity of this water conflict.
VI. THE WAY FORWARD: WHAT LESSONS LEARNT FROM
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
A.

INTRODUCTION

In light of the historical background and current political situation,
there are valid reasons to suggest that, in the short-term at least, attaining a binding arrangement is impossible. The issues, concerns and
challenges listed above require an innovative approach that incorporates lessons from international law and relevant state practice to address systematically these problems in a stepwise manner.'73 Due to the
highly stressed political environment in this region, this approach is
advisable for many reasons, but especially because such an approach
can potentially aid the decision-making process by clarifying the various steps states should take before committing themselves to follow
international law. The option of a binding treaty is only realistic when
all parties collectively agree to commit themselves entirely to the rigors
of a formal treaty regime.'74 Under such circumstances, international
cooperation efforts are more efficient and allow for greater options.
If Palestinians and Israelis start with such an informal arrangement
and demonstrate tangible benefits and progress, they will hopefully
find themselves in a position to generate the requisite national willingness to enter into arrangements that are more formal. This approach,
which relies on meeting the underlying legal concept of equity at all
times and circumstances, is by no means a repetition of earlier studies

172. See Israel-P.L.O. Declaration of Principles, supra note 153; Agreement on the
Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, supra note 154; Israeli-P.L.O. Interim Agreement
supra note 134.
173. The efforts that were facilitated by the Water Working Group on Water, followed a project-based approach, which ignored the issues, concerns and challenges.
See ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 159. These projects are semi frozen
now due to the unstable political situation.
174. The analysis was based on a treaty survey by this researcher of approximately
400 treaties concerning international watercourses. Most of these treaties include a
mutual recognition by States to each other's sovereign rights to the use of a portion of
the shared transboundary water. The absence of such recognition, as in the case of
Israel, continues to hinder the development of any equitable arrangement on the
Mountain Aquifer.
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and research on this topic.1

It is, however, undeniable that earlier

studies had an influence.
The following sections consolidate an approach that is believed to
adequately respond to the challenges raised with due attention to lessons learnt from international law, including but not restricted to the
1997 United Nations Watercourses Convention, the Bellagio Draft
Treaty, and relevant state practice.
B. INTRODUCING THE PROGRESSIVE APPROACH
This research reveals that, without cooperation, each entity's pursuit for more water supplies or less demand will take place unilaterally
with the probability of duplicate efforts and foregone opportunities.
In the initial stages at least, agreements other than formal treaties are
preferable because they are sufficient to allow the desired work to proceed and bear fruit. The informal process thus avoids the delays and
difficulties a formal treaty, due to its more cautious drafting and required approval, usually encounters. This is vitally important, not least
of all because Israel does not feel it is in a position to accept the longterm commitments of a treaty at this time, and is therefore not ready to
promptly ratify a treaty.
The proposal for approaching the water conflict within the Palestinian-Israeli context is therefore, to progressively establish a solid basis
for long-term sustainable cooperative arrangement. The progressive
approach starts with a non-binding flexible arrangement that can serve
the short-term need, and then gradually builds up into a final legal
binding arrangement based on principles of international law. In between these two extreme solutions lies an intermediate proposal, a
combination of coordination and collaboration, which is an output of
the first arrangement and an input to the final one.
The following analysis provides guidance on the structure of this
approach, including preconditions, measures and actions, shortcomings, impacts and funding requirements. The core difference between
this research and earlier studies, especially in this region, is the fact
that the ultimate objective of the approach proposed here is to reach a
final comprehensive, equitable and sustainable legal arrangement that
175. The only relevant study that can be cited here is one done by an academic Palestinian team. The study, which presented a stepwise open ended approach for the
identification of joint management structures for shared aquifers, falls short in terms
of its application of International Law. In fact, International Law is completely absent,
as evidenced by the fact that at the outset of the research, the "equity criterion" the
researchers referred to was dropped from their list of criteria for the analysis. This
might have been justified in this particular case, given the political sensitivities under
which the study had to be undertaken. To date, the study has not been brought to the
implementation level due to many political reasons. M. HADDAD & E. FEITLESON,
MANAGEMENT OF SHARED GROUNDWATER RESOURCES: THE ISRAEL[-PALESTINIAN CASE WITH
AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2000)

(on file with author).
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governs Palestinian-Israeli relations over their shared transboundary
groundwater.
C. DESCRIPTION AND PRECONDITIONS
As a precondition for successful cooperation over the Mountain
Aquifer water resources, it is recommended that the parties undertake
a more in depth revision of their negotiation styles in an attempt to
give momentum to the currently quasi-frozen negotiation process.
There is a need for mutual acknowledgement of common objectives in
relation to the shared water resources. To this end, establishing appropriate mechanisms to optimize utilization of the shared resource
for present and future generations is essential. Additionally, it is important to create an adequate dialogue and constructive communication to bring the parties back to the table of negotiations.
A significant precondition for the successful implementation of the
progressive approach is the mutual and genuine appreciation of the
necessity of cooperation with respect to shared water resources."' This
necessitates both parties' confirmation through an exchange of notes
of competent authorities on their current position on cooperation.
This proposal requires the parties to reconsider their positions on their
future relationship relating to their shared groundwater resources. At
the outset of cooperation, the parties should be cautious of the decisions they make, including the critical decision regarding the degree
and intensity of their cooperation, which depends on many political,
social and economic factors. 77'
The progressive approach is based on some important hypotheses:
(i) there is very little schematic knowledge about transboundary
groundwater especially on the side of the Palestinians, (ii) both parties
need guidance on the variety of existing options for international cooperation, (iii) the resolution of the conflict is envisaged to bear mutual benefit for the people and the shared resources, (iv) the ultimate
common objective must envisage a final binding legal arrangement on
the basis of international law related to transboundary groundwater.
The design of a legal regime and an institutional structure responsive
to the particular basin requires a deep understanding of this particular
field.
This approach is expected to set the stage for thoughtful elaboration at the technical level, whereby scientists, economists and lawyers
from both sides can establish an operational network of technical coordination and develop rules on procedures essential for protecting
and harnessing the transboundary groundwater resources. This strat-

176.

Id

177.

See U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, szpra note 20, at 18.
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egy requires persons with specialized training and experience to contribute substantially.
This article suggests that if the Palestinians and Israelis begin with
an informal arrangement that demonstrates tangible benefits and progress, they could generate the required national willingness to enter
into more formal arrangements. This case study demonstrates that
these problems derive mainly from political considerations, amplified
by technical, terminology and conceptual problems related to communicating information; and uncertainties associated with technical
analyses, impact assessments and grave management practices.
1. Identify the Problem
Among the many actions the parties need to take, they must identify the nature of the problem. This is perhaps the most difficult and
most important step in conflict avoidance, particularly given the intense hostility between the parties involved. Once they decide to cooperate, the mobilisation of available water resource management experts and the involvement of domestic governmental structures capable of effective international cooperation and collaboration become
171
necessary.
The need for third party intervention then arises, particularly to
address the issue of power inequity. The third party is recommended
to consist of one member nominated by each party, plus one member
that does not share the nationality of any of the parties whom the
nominated members who shall serve as chairpersons will choose."' It is
recommended that the team's expertise is diverse and includes a lawyer, a hydrogeologist and an economist. The third party team could
help the process by identifying aspects of the problem, the actors, and
they could also act as an advocate notjust for compromise, but also for
ensuring that the accuracy and reliability of facts and information.
This stage must emphasize the universal need for reliable data and
information, because without it the rational management of aquifers at
any level is impossible.
The next practical step is for the parties to identify the transboundary groundwater resources at issue, and agree on the geographic
hydrogeologic and hydrographic concepts' ° they are willing to employ
and the terminologies they are ready to adopt. "' The task of identify178. Id.
179. This step resembles Paragraph (4) of Article 33 of the 1997 UN Convention on
"Dispute Settlement." 1997 U.N. Watercourses Convention, supra note 54, art. 33 (4).
180.
The choice of the conceptual hydrogeological management unit is a significant
decision that the parties must make. The "Drainage Basin" concept is the best suited
for the optimal management development and protection of transboundary groundwater resources.
181.
This step is basically identifying the "Scope and Use of Terms."
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ing what groundwater aquifers are shared between them should be
'
based upon scientific evidence and hydrogeological investigations.
By and large, it is agreed that the Northeastern and the Western Aquifer Basins are transboundary. As for the Eastern Aquifer Basin, there is
a real need to jointly assess its transboundary status. A very important
goal in that regard is to mutually understand and respect the differences between the parties and try to reconcile them. These differences
are derived from the different stages of development, financial and
institutional capabilities, and the need for more water, use priorities
This scoping exercise is not an easy
and environmental concerns.'
task; in fact, it might constitute the most crucial decision-making process. Successfully accomplishing this complicated task makes the remaining tasks simpler, and lays the foundation for agreeing on subsequent requirements and identifying commitments.
The assessment of the strengths and weaknesses through technical
personnel and equipment is vitally important in this approach. Because the Israelis have developed faster than the Palestinians in the
field of water resources management and regulation, arrangements
must be made to exchange personnel and institute a program to create
working sites and educational institutions within the Palestine. Completing such a step will minimize and balance the asymmetries that
exist between the parties.
2. Agree on Interests and Not Positions
Having identified and agreed on the problem and the contested
groundwater resources, the parties should then agree on interests and
not positions." A vital step is to encourage the two parties to decide
on what their interests are and to identify options for mutual benefits.
Each party should negotiate only as long as its interests can be best
served at the negotiation table. At this stage, the parties are advised to
conduct a joint assessment of how they could employ international law
to achieve an integrative, equitable, and mutually beneficial arrangement for the parties in conflict. Once they achieve this goal, the parties will become more open to cooperate and collaborate in an environment of good faith. It is advisable at this stage for the parties to
M

182. These investigations are mainly available on the Israeli side, because during
occupation the Palestinians were denied access to important data related to the shared
groundwater resources.
183. The long years of occupation have negatively impacted all these areas of development for the Palestinians. These differences must be alleviated or modified through
the proposed cooperation.
184. The emphasis on positions has, for many years, widened the gap between the
Palestinians and the Israelis concerning their shared transboundary groundwaters. The
author recommends that the parties give up this approach, which failed to achieve a
feasible solution, and follow the "common interest" approach which is more realistic.
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evaluate assessments on the value of water using legal, economic and
social guidelines.8 At this point, the need will arise for specific activities to pave the way for further cooperation. Such activities are discussed below.
3. Create Options for Mutual Benefits
By this stage, the parties have hopefully developed a common understanding on the availability of water resources and their respective
vital human needs." It appears that "vital human needs" is a first call
on water. Similarly, there is a growing trend to recognize and protect
the vital needs of the river, or "vital environmental needs," in-stream
flow requirements and conservation measures. There are three key
global instruments related to human rights: the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,"' the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights," and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights.'
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted the General Comment on the Right to Water in
order to provide greater interpretive clarity as to the intent and mean-

185. This is in line with the Legal Assessment Model (LAM) developed by the
Knowledge and Research Project conducted by the International Water Law Research
Institute at Dundee University. INT'L WATER LAW RESEARCH INST., SHARING
TRANSBOUNDARY WATERS: AN INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF EQUITABLE ENTITLEMENT [hereinafter Dundee KAR Project],
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/law/iwlri/Documents/KaR/KaR%2OBrochure.pdf (last
visited Dec. 1, 2004). This research also seeks to operationalise "equitable and reasonable utilization" through a practice-oriented and interdisciplinary approach in the
context of shared unconfined groundwater aquifers between Israel and Palestine. Id.
The other two case studies are one that deals with upstream case (China) while the
other handles the downstream (Mozambique). Id.
186. See MINISTERIAL DECLARATION OF TIlE HAGUE ON WATER SECURITY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY, supra note 123, para. 1 (describing a meeting of government representatives
that committed themselves to meet the "vital human need" for water) The commentary to the 1997 U.N. Watercourses Convention defines these needs as "providing sufficient water to sustain human life, including both drinking water and water required for
the production of food in order to prevent starvation." 1997 U.N. Watercourses Convention, supra note 54, at 719, art. 10 cmt (referring to statement of understanding
pertaining to certain articles of the Convention). This wording does not adequately
define the population that is considered to be dependent on the watercourse, which
caused difficulties with its application in the case studies. The meeting of vital human
needs as such as drinking water or food can be achieved other than from the local
watercourse. In contrast ecological services do need to be delivered at the place of the
watercourse.
187. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 6, 1948, U.N.Doc A/810.
188. Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3, 6
I.L.M. 368 (entered into force in Mar. 23, 1976).
189. Int'l Covenant on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S
3,6 I.L.M. 360 (1966) (entered into forceJan. 3, 1976).
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ing of the Covenant.'m The 2002 General Comment used the term
"personal and domestic uses" rather than "vital human needs." This
term is broader in definition and content, and emphasises that the
right to water takes precedent over all other water needs.'9' The General Comment confirms that, although the adequacy of water required
for the right to water may vary according to different conditions, some
factors apply in all circumstances. The "vital human need" factor includes availability, quality, physical and economic accessibility, nondiscrimination and information accessibility. " 2 This factor also appears
in Article 10 of the 1997 United Nations Watercourses Convention,
which provided parties should resolve any conflict of use in accordance
with the rule of equitable and reasonable use in Articles 5 through 7,
giving "special regard ... to the requirements of vital human needs."19
The commentary to these articles defined these needs as "providing
sufficient water to sustain human life, including both drinking water
and water required for the production of food in order to prevent starvation.""''

This wording did not adequately define the population that

is considered to be dependent on the watercourse, which caused difiiculties with its application in the case studies. The local watercourse is
not the only means to achieve satisfaction of vital human needs for
drinking water or food. In contrast, ecological services do need to be
delivered at the place of the watercourse.
In the area of the case study, neither party has formally defined or
accepted a minimum water requirement ("MWR"). Peter Gleick stated
that present urban water uses suggest an appropriate level might be
between 75 and 150 cubic meters per person per year
(cm/person/year). Hillel Shuval, a water quality scientist of international stature based at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, provided an
estimate for the minimum legitimate baseline water needs of the Israelis and Palestinians. This amount is required to ensure a reasonable
minimum standard of living in a semi-arid area suffering from serious
water shortages. He proposed the MWR for domestic, urban, and in-

190. Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the InternationalCovenant of Economic, Social and CulturalRights, General Comment 15: The Right To Water, U.N. ESCOR,
29th Sess., Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (2002) [hereinafter GC15],
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/gcl5.doc (last visited Oct. 16, 2004).
191. Id. art. 12 n.13. The term "personal and domestic uses" includes: (i) drinking,
(meaning "water for consumption through beverages and foodstuffs"); (ii) personal
sanitation, (meaning "disposal of human excreta"); (iii) food preparation, (including
"food hygiene and preparation of food stuffs, whether water is incorporated into, or
comes into contact with, food"); and (iv) personal and household hygiene, (meaning
"personal cleanliness and hygiene of the household environment."). Id.
192. Id. art. 12.
193. 1997 U.N. Watercourses Convention, supra note 54, at 705-07, art. 5-7, 10.
194. Id. at 719, art. 10, cmt. (referring to statements of understanding pertaining to
certain articles of the Convention).
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dustrial uses for Israelis and Palestinian alike would be approximately
125 cm/person/year.
The second call for states is to examine their economic and social
development needs and the extent to which the available resources can
meet all their needs without compromising the sustainability and longterm safe yield of the resources. The results of this study might recommend the reconsideration of water utilizations among the parties
and therefore a decision in response will be crucial. If the results reveal that even under an equitable and reasonable utilization scenario,
the existing resources are not adequate to compensate for the regional
shortage, the parties are required to create options for mutual benefits
and commonly plan for the valuable regional water resources to ensure
their sustainable development. ' They could also cooperate in the
areas of developing unconventional water resources, such as desalinated water or regional development projects.19 Linkages could have
been made to provide the Israelis with good will benefits while providing the Palestinians with technical assistance that could have raised the
level of knowledge of the water resources in the Middle East in the Palestinian Authority to the level of the other parties. There was no real
reason to build another water database in Israel, which no one in Israel
uses, while there was a tremendous need for the Palestinian Water Authority to build its own water database.
4. Joint Assessment of Legal Entitlement from the Mountain Aquifer
The study of the legal entitlements by each side to transboundary
groundwater is of vital importance to the success of the proposed progressive approach. The agreement among the parties to conduct such
a study would indicate good intentions and contribute to building trust
between them. It is recommended to follow a systematic approach in
identifying the factors that affect and are affected by the existing trans195. Many regional studies have been implemented under the multilateral talks,
without controversy, due to the fact that the first step of assessing the legal entitlement
in the fashion mentioned here was never completed. Additionally, these projects were
conducted under the umbrella of the Multilateral Working Group on Water, where
donors have offered to pledge money for projects that are expected to contribute to
the peace process. ISRAEL MINIsTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 159. The Zambezi
Action Plan, provides a range of significant tasks and projects that could be implemented as part of the protection of the transboundary groundwater resources. See
Agreement on the Action Plan for the Environmentally Sound Management of the
Common Zambezi River System, May 28, 1987,
ocid.nacse.org/qml/research/tfdd/toTFDDdocs/ 177ENG.htm (last visited Oct. 17,
2004).

196. These projects include the Mediterranean Sea Dead Sea and the Red Sea Dead
Sea Conveyance projects, the later being lately identified as ajordanians Israeli initiative with the possible involvement of the Palestinians. See SHARI BERKE, AMERICAN
UNIV., TRADE & ENVIRONMENT DATABAsF, CASE STUDIES No. 429: DEAD SEA CANAL, § 5-6,
http://www.american.edu/ted/deadsea.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2004).
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boundary groundwater recourses and their distribution. The recent
research efforts conducted by the Knowledge and Research Project
("KAR Project") 97 in this field are very relevant. One of the major outputs of the KAR Project was the development of a methodology to help
states assess their legal entitlements and obligations with respect to
their shared water resources. The methodology is supported by certain
tools created for the purpose including: the "Glossary of Terms,"'9 8 the
"Relevant Factors Matrix, '"" the "Legal Audit Scheme,"" geographic, '
hydrographic, °' hydrologic or hydrogeologic, °' climatic, ' population
197. See Dundee KAR Project, supra note 185, at Final Project Report (May 5, 2004).
198. Id. at 57 (defining the Glossary of Terms as including all terms that are expected to have dual interpretations among hydrologists, economists, lawyers and other
people working in the field of water).
199. Id. at 84 (stating that the "Matrix of Factors" is inspired by the list of factors
that are set forth in Article 6 of the 1997 U.N. Watercourses Convention and Article V
(a)-(k) of the 1966 Helsinki Rules. The Matrix of Factors combines both, and includes
the research team's finding on how to best present these factors in an acceptable manner).
200. Id. at 64. The purpose of the Legal Audit Scheme (LAS) is to provide a snapshot of the legal context within which the State operates. It provides an overview of the
existing legal entitlements and obligations and is a tool to be used by a State in order
to identify its rights and obligations as well as respective rights and obligations of other
States sharing the same transboundary watercourse. Id. The State can thus ascertain
in a systematic manner the relevant provisions of international agreements in force for
this State and other legal instruments, which may affect its existing or planned uses of
the waters of an international watercourse. Additionally the I.AS is designed to help
ensure compliance by a State, with its existing commitments. It will also assist a State
to monitor and verify performance by other States parties by assessing how effectively
they implement and enforce their respective treaty obligations. Id. Additionally, the
LAS should identify whether a State's national law is in conflict with its international
legal obligations.
201. Setting the geographic context includes a statement on the location of the
Watercourse State, whether it lies is downstream or upstream with respect to the specific groundwater aquifer, and to what extent this factor is important and relevant to
the whole assessment study. Id. at 89.
202. Id. at 90. The hydrographic factor mainly concerns the extent of the international watercourse in the territory of each watercourse State. It is most usefully expressed as the proportion, in relation to the area of the whole basin that occurs in the
State of interest. Id. It can be measured from "maps at scales appropriate to the size of
the basin." Id. In many cases this is a straightforward procedure, but difficulties can
sometimes occur. The extent of the watercourse is interpreted to mean the extent of
the aquifer, whether confined or not, in each territory. Id. As the aquifer cannot be
seen at the surface, its extent is not as obvious as is the drainage basin. Its assessment
will depend on the availability of geological and hydrogeological maps or reports and
accurate and large-scale
studies of the hydrogeology of the area. "In some cases ...
maps ...
may not be available, and this will inevitably limit the.., accuracy" of the result.
Id. "The definition of the extent of the aquifer as used here is also limited by the practicability of its exploitation. For instance, in some areas water bearing strata may be so
deep underground that they could not practicably be used to supply water; such areas
would not be included as part of the extent of the aquifer." Id. Also in the case of
transhrmnrl-v romndwater it is wise to consider the overall surface area of the aouifers at issue together with any activities taking place on this area that might influence
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dependence,"°' economic and social factors... that must be jointly collected, compiled and analyzed in a consistent manner." The impact

the quality and quantity of the recharged water (land use, industrial activities, and
waste disposal, etc.).
203. Id. at 91, 94-95. "Hydrology is taken to include both surface water and groundwater. A number of different aspects need to be examined in order to assess this [factor] properly: A. Mean water availability; B. Variability of the resources; C. Water quality; D. Contribution of water to the [watercourse] by each [watercourse] State; E. Potential climate change impacts" and possible interactions between groundwaters and
surface waters. Id. Mean annual availability: "[i]n most cases, mean water availability
for groundwater is taken to be the long-term safe yield that may be extracted from the
aquifer. The safe yield is the amount of water which can, on average, be extracted indefinitely without depleting the storage of the aquifer. This is equivalent to the average rate of recharge or replenishment of the aquifer from surface water." Id. at 94.
Variability of Resources: the variability of the resources is relevant because the greater
the variation over time, the less practicable it is to make effective use of the resource.
Both seasonal and inter-annual variability are significant.
For surface water,
"[s]easonal variability can usually be described by the average amount of variation
between the wet season and the dry season. The inter-annual variability is the amount
of variation of the annual flows over a long series of data, described, for instance, by
the coefficient of variation of annual flows, as well as by the highest and lowest annual
flows ever recorded." Id. As noted above, "river flows should be assessed over a long
time series [30 years or more] of monthly flows," and if this has been done, then there
would already be sufficient information to describe the variability. Id. at 95. Groundwater resources "are often teated as invariant with time, and they are in any case usually much less variable than surface water. However, there are cases where the variation is significant, and this should therefore be assessed in the same way as with surface
water." Id. Assessment of inter-annual variability is an important factor in allocating
water as it may be that States require water for different purposes at different times.
Water quality: "[t] he quality of the water is important since this can determine whether
or not water that is physically available can actually be used for a particular purpose."
Id.
204. Id. at 98. Assessment of the climatic factor does not necessarily require a detailed study of the climate of the area. "The broad climate type.. .should be identified,
along with the long-term mean monthly rainfall. Potential evaporation rates should
also be determined." Id. "Observed data are available almost everywhere to enable this
to be done, although data paucity may still be experienced." Id. As for the hydrological factor, the "[s]easonal and inter-annual variability of the precipitation should be
identified. Where long, reliable records are available, trends in climate patterns
should be identified." Id.
205. Population in the basin includes (i) Present and projected population; (ii)
Populations in the study country and in the other States; (iii) "Distribution of population;" (iv) "Growth and migration of population;" and (v) Livestock. Id. at 86.
206. "This factor identifies the demands on or the uses of the [watercourse], and the
economic and other benefits that flow from the uses." Id. at 104. "The first step is to
identify the uses themselves, both existing and potential, and then to consider the
benefits derived from them. The existing and potential uses are the first two components, but certain types of use - meeting 'vital human needs,' social use, and ecological
or environmental use - are considered as special ones and are also treated individually.
Id.
207. See id. at 86-87 (illustrating the combination of all the above mentioned factors
in the Relevant Factors Matrix, developed by the KAR project).
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of the existing and planned uses of one state on the other,"° the efficiency and availability of alternatives including the potential for conjunctive use of the available waters are also factors that must as well be
jointly studied and analyzed. For the evaluation of what is equitable
and reasonable, the parties are recommended to adopt a unified
method of evaluation"n that is commonly developed and accepted.
The success of such evaluation depends mainly on the availability of
accurate and reliable information to be shared by the parties." '° The
study shall address the questions of how to implement the customary
international law rule on "equitable and reasonable utilization" in the
case of transboundary groundwater, and how to best inform and influence decision-making. This will be done by examining the type of data
needed to incorporate legal, technical and social science existing requirements and needs of the future. What is the format for data collection and presentation to allow exchange and easy access? How dynamic is the process? What are the triggers for the reassessment? Is
there a generic model that could be implemented in cases of transboundary groundwater aquifers?
The final conclusions of this study will offer guidance to the parties
on how to determine their legal entitlement from these shared resources. The study shall assess the quality and adequacy of the available data to identify gaps and needs for data improvement. The long208. "Impact is the effect[s], [both] positive and negative, which a use of the waters
of the [watercourse] has on other uses or the [watercourse] itself. Id. at 116. It is important to determine the transboundary impacts, that is, the effects that uses in one
State have on the other States in the basin, but consideration should also be given to
impacts within national boundaries. Id. The impacts of both existing and potential
uses need to be examined, and there should be a clear separation between the two: the
impacts of potential uses should be explicitly identified and separated from the impacts .of the existing ones. Id. "The evidence of actual harm or beneficial effects
should be clear and convincing. It is essential that the projected impacts of potential
uses be shown to be likely rather than merely speculative." Id.
209. The parties should employ the Method of Evaluation that was developed under
the KAR Project. id. at 131.
210. Modern water management requires a large integrated knowledge base,
data/information on the natural/ physical characteristics of the resource, on the social
and economic uses needs and demands. The data has to be available in order to be
shared and exchanged. A precondition for generating such data is availability of modem reliable monitoring networks and assessment systems. Monitoring needs to be
embedded in a strategic 'holistic' approach. In addition to monitoring, institutional
arrangements regarding data provision and exchange are necessary (e.g. water uses).
In the Palestinian case none of the conditions applies. The generation of and access to
data has been prohibited for the past years of occupation. The hydrological monitoring network dates back to the 1960's, which is not in operation at present. As for Israel,
in the last few decades it has been developing rapidly in the field of monitoring and
assessment. Unfortunately most of the significant research and data relevant to the
transboundary groundwater has been classified as confidential. The few reports that
are published and exchanged with the Palestinians are those which are not considered
a threat to Israel's 'water security'.
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term vision must be a unified comprehensive database that incorporates all water data and related information pertinent to the development utilization and protection of the shared groundwater resources."'
An assessment of the Vital Human Needs and the degree of dependence of the population on the transboundary groundwater resources is
the first step in the legal entitlement assessment exercise.2 If it is
practically difficult to carry out the assessment jointly, the determination of the factors and their relevance to the transboundary groundwaters can be done separately, the results of which can be discussed
jointly to reach an agreement on to come out with a reasonable. Logically following this unified method of evaluation is expected to yield
results that are not significantly different and, therefore, reaching consensus becomes easier. Although employing the Legal Assessment
Model paves the road for more proactive steps, the process for completing the assessment is essential.
5. Collaboration andJoint Projects
This stage brings the efforts, studies and research from the technical cooperation phase into practical implementation. In fact, those
efforts will be wasted if no action follows them. Types of collaboration
may include technical, economic, financial, administrative and political
fields. The difference between this stage and the technical cooperation stage lies mainly in the need at this point to implement projects
and commence programmes that might influence existing uses. Water
officials from each party have to be alerted to plans and the various
options available to meet the need of any stage of development of their
shared groundwater system. To achieve the foregoing, it is essential to
establish appropriate mechanisms for cooperation and to fulfil crucial
requisites. The said efforts include: (i) proactive support and longterm commitment at the political level, (ii) the mobilisation of the
available expertise in the various fields relevant to water resources
management, and (iii) the enactment of a domestic governmental
structure capable of effective international cooperation and collaboration. Each of these projects must provide a specific contribution to this
multidisciplinary initiative aiming to improve understanding 6f scientific, socio-economic, legal, institutional and environmental issues surrounding the management of transboundary aquifers. The resulting
projects from the first stage are considered intermediary outputs and
211. The Regional Waternet project that was initiated under the multilateral talks
can be reactivated and better developed to fulfil] this objective. ISRAEL MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 159.
212. See STEPI-AN LIBISZEWSKI, CTR. FOR SEC. POLICY AND CONFICT RESEARCH/ SwIss
PEACE FOUND.,

WATER DIsPUTES IN THE JORDAN BASIN REGION AND THEIR ROLE IN THE

RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB-IsRAELI CONFLICT, ENCOP Occasional Paper No. 13, at ch. 2,

6 (1995), http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/encop/13/enl3.htm (last visited May 2003).
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must be used as inputs for the next stage. These include conducting
transboundary groundwater surveys,2 ' and the development of monitoring and assessment guidelines.2 4" The integral basin area approach
must be used as the basic concept for structuring the guidelines on
monitoring and assessment. Also essential for the transboundary
groundwater assessment is the development and evaluation of strategic
policies for compatible groundwater management."' The parties must
pursue projects that aim to harmonize national laws and regulations.
Lessons could be learnt from best practices in national regulations that
respond to the challenges of special issues and concerns about transboundary groundwater.
National regulations can be accordingly
adapted and modified to provide a harmonized legal framework governing the utilization and development of these resources at the national level, especially in the following areas: (a) where the matter is
significant in the sphere of basin wide or system wide water policy and
water management, (b) where there is discriminatory impact on nonnational users, and (c) where national users are placed at competitive
disadvantages with respect to a similar class of users in the other state."
The removal of legal conflicts and the enactment of the essential regulation in the respective state codes are essential to water use optimization and to the promotion of regional development and cooperation
generally.
213. E. ALMASSY & Zs. BuzAs, supra note 18, at 8. The survey could have the following
scope and objectives: (a) to highlight "the location, extension and type of transboundary groundwaters;" (b) assess "monitoring activities, pollution sources and contamination of transboundary groundwaters;" (c) identify the "uses, problems and trends in
the state of groundwater according to the observations;" and (d) propose the "institutional- and international aspects in their management in the" Middle East region. Id
214. U.N./ECE TASK FORCE ON MONITORING & ASSESSMENT, GUIDELINES ON
MONITORING AND
ASSESSMENT OF TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATERS 9-11
(2000),
http://www.unece.org/env/water/publications/documents/guidelinesgroundwater.p
df (last visited Dec. 1, 2004). The first step is to characterize the transboundary
groundwater system in terms of flows, recharge discharge areas, interaction between
surface and groundwater. Id. at 9. Activities within the recharge areas at one side of
the borders which might adversely affect the groundwater quality on the other side of
the border must be monitored. Id. at 9-10. The actual and possible future functions
and uses of the aquifers must be assessed based on the quantity and quality features of
the groundwater system concerned. The next step is assessing the vulnerability of the
aquifer which identifies those zones of the aquifer system which are considered vulnerable to threats and therefore require an early warning system to avoid occurrence of
pollution. This step will include the identification of types of threats, measures and
the monitoring cycle. There will be a need to assess also the current monitoring and
assessments practices and identify gaps, and based on that, design the groundwater
monitoring systems. Id. at 24.
215. This means, for example, in order to assess trends in groundwater quality, the
definition for trends should be comparable on both sides of the borders. Also, the
methodologies for estimating annual recharge and safe yields of the shared aquifers
must be compatible. See id. at 7.
216. See U.N. DEP'T OF EcON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, supra note 20, at 18.
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6. Treaty Formulation
At this level of cooperation, the parties are hopefully in a position
to establish common objective criteria in their efforts to conclude a
water treaty. The parties are recommended to recognize and accept
their common responsibility to ensure reasonable and equitable development and management of groundwaters in the border region for
the well-being of their peoples."'7 In the treaty formulation process,
attention must be paid to the fact that international water resources
development involves policy decisions and complex technical assignments. The current stage requires the knowledgeable and persistent
support of political forces. To that end, it is recommended that parties
attempt to revitalize the negotiation process through an in depth reconsideration of the negotiations approach. As a basis for treaty formulation, the parties' common objective must include the need to attain optimum utilization and conservation of transboundary groundwaters and to protect the underground environment. This type of understanding requires the parties to develop and maintain reliable data
and information concerning transboundary aquifers and their waters
in order to use and protect these waters in a rational and informed
manner.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The preceding analysis concludes that international law provides
the mechanisms for amicable and peaceful solutions over the utilization, development and protection of shared water resources. The
modern development of the law in the field of transboundary groundwater demonstrates an increased awareness of the current and emerging water crises, the risks from uncontrolled use of groundwaters that
cross borders between two or more states, and the importance of international cooperation in resolving conflicts over international waters.
This development, however, has not yet triggered, at least in the area
of the case studies, the conclusion of legally binding agreements concerning shared transboundary groundwater.
In the absence of formal treaties, this research determines there is
an emerging trend to establish networks and cooperative frameworks
that are informal and technical. In Africa, the latter trend is primarily
observed in the context of transboundary confined groundwaters,
which are a highly valuable resource subject to no legally binding arrangement.
In Europe, however, these cooperative frameworks
emerge in the field of connected transboundary groundwater that are
also unregulated. Europe is increasingly realizing the need to increase
217. See generally Hayton & Utton, supra note 21 (describing motivations and interests of states forming groundwater treaties).
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knowledge and awareness on their shared transboundary groundwaters, but it has not yet done so in the form of a binding treaty. As for
the Middle East, especially in countries where the transboundary water
resources are highly disputed, such as in Israel, Jordan and Palestine,
informal regional cooperation is considered to be more viable and
preferable because the current prospects for concluding obligatory
commitments relating to the shared transboundary groundwaters are
bleak.
This research concludes that the fundamental rule governing the
utilization of connected transboundary groundwater is the equitable
and reasonable utilization, which includes the factor related to the degree of harm. The preceding discussion demonstrates that states appear rarely to dedicate special attention to the regulation of their
transboundary groundwater. It is also evident that such resources, if
included within the scope of international arrangements, are treated
similarly to surface water. This research also finds that only connected
transboundary groundwaters are included within the scope of the existing treaties. Confined transboundary aquifers remain formally unregulated. Such waters, and the laws governing their utilization, are currently under study and review by the ILC.
In the context of the case study, it was demonstrated that the main
problems derive mainly from political considerations, amplified by
technical, terminology and conceptual problems related to communicating information; and uncertainties associated with technical analyses, impact assessments and grave management practices. It was also
found that after many years of conflict, the Israelis and Palestinians
have succeeded in achieving some level of on cooperation, which is
however, impeded by negotiations. The negotiations in question are
characterized their inequality in powers among the disputants. Analysis of the style of negotiation reveal that the major barrier is that one
Israel, with superior power in every respect, does not recognize the
other Palestinian right to an independent existence, nor does it acknowledge the Palestinian other parties' national aspirations.
The water arrangements established through the peace process are
politically sensitive, which is one explanation for their complete failure
to address the needs of the population under the stressed political
situation. Other reasons for this failure include the asymmetric conditions of the two parties at technical, political and financial levels.
Above all, the heart of the problem is that these arrangements do not
address the issues of legal entitlements between the parties. Israel continues to exercise full control over all the water resources, including
those transboundary groundwaters shared with the Palestinians. The
essence of their failure lies in the lack of prior consideration by both
parties to the scope and the intensity of cooperation they wish to exert.
The existing agreements are merely temporary solutions for solving
only the immediate domestic needs of the Palestinians; they are
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mechanisms to coordinate water-related activities within the two jurisdictions for the transitional five years of the interim period, which expired in September of 1998. The last seven years of negotiations have
made minimal progress. The parties have still not achieved a common
agreement on the overarching principles that should govern future
utilization of the international transboundary water resources.
Despite the conclusions above, this research offers many lessons to
be learnt in the context of transboundary groundwater shared between
Israel and Palestine. It suggests that if the Palestinians and Israelis begin with an informal arrangement that demonstrates tangible benefits
and progress, they could garner the national support needed to enter
into more formal arrangements. The challenge is how the parties can
negotiate an agreement irrespective of their unequal bargaining power
by relying on the role of ethical considerations and good intentions. It
will require great efforts from the Palestinian negotiators and the international mediators to engage the Israelis in negotiations over water
in the above-proposed approach to resume the final status negotiations. Of crucial importance is the mutual agreement on the benefits
gained from establishing cooperation based on genuine intentions.
This research suggests technical cooperation is the starting point for
further intensive collaboration and cooperation.

PROPOSED FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT
CONCERNING THE UTILIZATION
DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECTION OF THE
MOUNTAIN AQUIFER
DR. FADIA DAIBES
INTRODUCTION
From this research perspective it is proposed that the United Nations Watercourses Convention is the most authoritative statement developed so far in the field of non-navigational uses of international
watercourse, including transboundary groundwaters. The 1997 United
Nations Watercourses Convention, however, fails to address the specific needs of optimal and sustainable utilization and development of
transboundary groundwaters. Additionally, the Convention does not
adequately nor comprehensively respond to the management and
regulation needs of transboundary groundwater. To compensate for
this gap, it is suggested here that the detailed procedures, mechanisms
and required institutions contained in the Bellagio Draft Treaty and
relevant State Practice. It is therefore proposed that an Agreement
that is tailored as combination of the 1997 United Nations Watercourses Convention, the Bellagio Draft Treaty and best State practice
might provide an ideal alternative for the utilization of transboundary
groundwater regulation be used. The substantive rules might derive
from the 1997 United Nations Watercourses Convention while the
procedural rules from the Bellagio Draft Treaty. This Draft Framework
Agreement is based on the research done in Chapter 3 and 4. This
step is the last step in the progressive approach that is proposed in
Chapter 6. As mentioned in Chapter Five-section 5.2.6.1 there is a
need to agree on the definition of some terms prior the drafting of a
legally binding treaty. Some of the crucial definitions are included in
this proposal. Only part of these definitions will be included in the
final treaty, however, the author of this thesis envisioned to present a
wider range of definitions that need to be agreed upon between the
parties.
DEFINITIONS
AQUIFER
A subsurface water bearing geologic formation from which significant
quantities of water may be extracted.
ARTICLE 40
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Article of the Interim Agreement, Annex III, and Appendix I, which
deals with water allocation but refers to the immediate needs of the
Palestinians without considering the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization of the water resources by both sides. Additional
amounts of 70-80 mcm were allocated for the Palestinians with 28.6
mcm/yr identified as immediate needs. The future needs of the Palestinians on the WB were estimated at 70-80 mcm/year. The two parties
agreed to establish a Joint Water Committee (JWC) to serve as institutional mechanism for the interim period, mainly to oversee the implementation of Article 40.
ASSESSMENT
The evaluation of the hydrological, chemical and/or micro-biological
state of groundwaters in relation to the background conditions, human
effects, and the actual or intended uses, which may adversely affect
human health or the environment.
BORDER REGION
The area within approximately ............. kilometres from each side of
the mutual boundary as set forth on the annexed map
COASTAL AQUIFER
The Coastal Aquifer is stretched along the Mediterranean Sea, its
length from north to south is 120 km and its width is 7-20 kin. The active storage of the aquifer is estimated as 20 billion CM (cubic meters)
of water and its safe yield is close to 300 MCM/Y (million CM per
year). The aquifer contributes some 20% of the fresh water supply of
Israel's water supply
CONJUNCTIVE USE
The integrated development and management of surface and groundwater as a total water supply system.
CONTAMINANT
Any substance, species or energy which detrimentally affects directly,
indirectly, cumulatively or in combination with other substances, human health or safety or agricultural or industrial products or processes,
or flora, fauna or an ecosystem.
CONTAMINATION
Any detrimental chemical, physical, biological, or temperature change
in the content or characteristics of a body of water.
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Certain "unwritten" rules generally accepted by states as legally binding; a general practice of states accepted as law. Customary rules of
international law may be "codified" in a multilateral convention, such
as the 1997 International Watercourses Convention. However, these
rules are legally binding for all states regardless of whether or not they
are parties to such a "codification" treaty. Those customary rules which
govern the conduct of Transboundary Watercourse States vis-a-vis each
other include: the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization;
the duty to give notice of a planned measure (use) that may cause sig-
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nificant adverse effects; the duty to take measures aimed at preventing
significant harm to or within the territory of another TWC State; the
duty to co-operate; and the duty to peacefully settle international disputes.
DEPLETION
The withdrawal of water from an aquifer at a rate faster than it is recharged, otherwise known as "mining" the aquifer.
DRAINAGE BASIN
The geographical area, which extends over the territories of the two
Parties and is determined by the boundaries of the transboundary
groundwater system, including interrelated surface and underground
water, flowing into a common terminus.
DROUGHT
A condition of abnormal water scarcity in a specific area resulting from
natural conditions.
DROUGHT ALERT
The declared condition provided for in Article XIX.
DROUGHT EMERGENCY
The declared emergency provided for in Article XIX
DROUGHT MANAGEMENT PLAN
The plan provided for pursuant to Article XIX
EASTERN AQUIFER BASIN (EAB)
Transboundary Aquifer (but not shared with Israel), located and recharged almost entirely in the West Bank, with the feeding and storage
area spread over 2,200 km2 mostly in the West Bank. A small part of
recharge is located west of the Green Line, including West Jerusalem.
The Oslo I Agreement estimated the recharge of the EAB at 172
mcm/yr. This aquifer feeds the lower Jordan River and it is therefore
considered to be the Palestinian contribution to the waters of the Jordan River Basin.
ENVIRONMENTAL SENSITIVITY
Vulnerability or susceptibility to changes detrimentally affecting the
quality of life or one or more biological or physical systems.
EQUITABLE AND REASONABLE UTILIZATION
The fundamental principle of international water law entitling a
Transboundary Watercourse State to an equitable and reasonable
share of the uses and benefits of a watercourse and creating the correlative obligation not to deprive other Transboundary Watercourse
States of their respective right. Factors that may be used to identify an
equitable and reasonable use are summarized in Article 6 of the 1997
UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.
GAZA AQUIFER
Is a classical coastal aquifer, which represents the sole water source of
the Gaza Strip covering an area of 360 (kMi) with a total recharge of
approximately 60 mcm/yr. The Gaza aquifer is threatened by seawater
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and salt ground water inu-usion due to over pumping, and by pollution
especially nitrates from the overuse of fertilizers and infiltration of
sewage.
GROUNDWATER
The water contained in interconnected pores located below the water
table in an unconfined aquifer or located in a confined aquifer that is
supplying wells and springs. Currently some 85% of the groundwater
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is exploited by Israel, supplying about
40% of Israel's water. Because Palestine is not allowed to utilize the
Jordan River waters, groundwater is the only source for Palestinian
supply.
HARM
Damage or any detrimental consequence of a human activity such as,
inter alia, (a) loss of life or personal injury: (b) loss or injury to property; (c) the costs of reasonable measures to prevent or minimize such
loss or injury; (d) environmental harm, including the costs of reasonable measures to prevent or minimize such harm, and the costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement or restoration of the environment
actually undertaken or to be undertaken. Under customary law, a
TWC State has a duty to take all reasonable measures to prevent causing significant harm to another TWC State or States.
IMPAIRMENT
Any physical change in an aquifer or its recharge area, which significantly reduces or restricts the potential for use of the waters of the aquifer.
INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA
STRIP (also referred to as Taba or Oslo II Agreement)
Concluded in Taba on 26 Sept. 1995 and signed in Washington on the
28th. Outlines the 2nd stage of Palestinian autonomy, extending it to
other parts of the West Bank, which is divided into Area A (full Palestinian civil jurisdiction and internal security), Area B (full Palestinian
civil jurisdiction, joint Israeli-Palestinian internal security), and Area C
(Israeli civil and overall security control). Furthermore, the election
and powers of a Palestinian Legislative Council were determined.
(Oct. 1997 was the target date for the completion of further redeployment and Oct. 1999 for reaching a final status agreement.) In the
Agreement both parties recogniz2ed the need to protect the environment, utilize natural resources on a sustainable and environmentally
sound basis and cooperate in sewage, solid waste and water issues. The
agreement explicitly states that Israel recognizes Palestinian water
rights, to be negotiated in the final status talks without further elaboration on the nature of these fights or the principles governing the rights
and obligations of both parties. Article 12 expressly recognized water
as a natural resource. Annex III, Appendix I, and Article 40 of the
agreement deals with water allocation.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Law that governs the relations between entities capable of possessing international rights and duties and having capacity to maintain its
rights by bringing international claims.
INTERRELATED SURFACE WATER
Those surface waters in the territory of either Party, the quantity or
quality of which is affected by the out flows from, or the inflows to,
transboundary groundwater.
JOINT COMMITTEE
The Committee established under Art VIII.
JORDAN RIVER
The Jordan River begins in three headwaters. The Hasbani River originates in Lebanon and has at least parts of its flow in Lebanon with an
average flow of 140 mcm/yr. The Dan and Banias Rivers originate in
the Golan Heights and both flow into the Jordan above Lake Tabarriya
having average annual flows of 250 and 120 mcm respectively. The
lower Jordan River is fed from groundwater flow and runoff from the
West Bank and Syrian andJordanian waters, and by the Yarmouk River,
which originates in Syria, borders Jordan, Syria and the Golan Heights
with average flows of 420 mcm/yr. Israel uses 685 mcm/yr from the
Jordan River while the Palestinians have been deprived access to its
waters, although it is the main regional surface water system and the
only permanent surface water source for Palestine. Currently, Israel
diverts 75% of the river's water before it reaches the West Bank.
JORDAN RIVER BASIN
Major international watercourse in the Middle East region; shared between Syria, Lebanon,Jordan, Palestine and Israel.
LAKE TIBERIA (also called Sea of Galilee; Arabic: Buhayrat
Tabariyya)
Lake on the south-western Syrian-Palestinian border through which
the Jordan River flows. From 1948 to 1967 Syria had access to its
north-eastern shoreline. Located 686 feet (209 m) below sea level, it
has a surface area of 64 square miles (166 square kin). The sea's maximum depth, which occurs in the northeast, is 157 feet (48 m). Measuring 13 miles (21 km) from north to south and 7 miles (11 km) from
east to west, it is pear-shaped. The Lake is fed primarily by the Jordan
River. Other streams and wadis (seasonal watercourses) flow into the
lake from the hills of Galilee. In the rivers associated with the lake and
at the bottom of the lake itself are many mineral deposits. Because of
these deposits and because of the strong evaporation, the lake's waters
are relatively salty.
MONITORING
The process of repetitive observing, for defined purposes of one or
more elements of the environment according to pre-arranged schedules in space and time and using comparable methodologies for envi-
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ronmental sensing and data collection. It provides information concerning the present state and past trends in environmental behaviour
NORTHEASTERN AQUIFER BASIN (NEAB)
Transboundary aquifer covering the areas of Nablus and Jenin in the
West Bank; its waters flow northwards to their major outlets in the Bet
Shean Springs in northern Israel. The feeding and storage area of 700
km2 lies completely in the West Bank (650 km2). The NEAB starts
near Nablus and flows towards the Gilboa Mountains, Jezreal and Bet
Shean Valley to the northeast. In the Oslo II Agreement the recharge
of the NFAB was estimated to yield 145 mcm/yr. This is within the
meaning above defined.
OVER-PUMPING
When uncontrolled groundwater withdrawals exceed the safe yield of
the aquifer.
POLLUTION
The introduction of any contaminant by man, directly or indirectly,
into groundwaters or surface waters.
PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY
The declared emergency provided for in Article XV.
RECHARGE
The addition of water to an aquifer by infiltration of precipitation
through the soil or of water from surface streams, lakes, or reservoirs,
by discharges of water to the land surface, or by injection of water into
the aquifer through wells.
SAFE YIELD
The amount of naturally occurring groundwater that can be economically and legally withdrawn from an aquifer on a sustained basis without impairing the native groundwater quality or creating an undesirable effect such as environmental damage. It cannot exceed the increase in recharge or leakage from adjacent strata plus the reduction
in discharge, which is due to decline in head caused by pumping.
SURFACE WATER
All water naturally opens to the atmosphere (rivers, lakes, reservoirs,
streams, seas, etc.). The main regional surface water system and the
only permanent surface water source for Palestine is the Jordan River
and its tributaries.
TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFER
An aquifer intersected by a common boundary. Within this Agreement
these aquifers are the Northeastern Aquifer Basin (NEAB) and the
Western Aquifer Basin (WAB)
TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION AREA
An area declared by the Committee pursuant to Article VII.
TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATERS
Waters in the transboundary aquifers.
VITAL HUMAN NEEDS
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Drinking water sufficient to sustain human life and water required for
the production of food in order to prevent starvation. The quantity
and quality of water needed to sustain human life. This definition is
based on the definition under the 1997 UN International Watercourses
Convention, and is the one used here. In its common usage in the
water sector, the term does not include water "for the production of
food in order to prevent starvation."
WESTERN AQUIFER BASIN (WAB)
Transboundary Aquifer located in the Western part of the West Bank.
The recharge area is 1,800 km2 of which 1,400 km2 lie in the West
Bank. The storage area of 2,500 km2 lies in Israel. Two major natural
outlets are Rash E-Ein (Rosh Ha'ayn) and the Tamaseeh Springs. The
WAB is estimated to have a recharge of 362 mcm/yr.
WADI (in Arabic)
Channel which is dry except in the rainy season.
THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The State of Israel ("Israel") and the Palestine Liberation Organization ("PLO"), the representative of the Palestinian people ("Parties"); motivated by the spirit of cordiality and cooperation which characterizes the relations between them;
Recognizing the critical importance of their transboundary water resources and the need to enhance the rational use and conservation of
the said resources on a long term basis;
Affirming that these groundwater basins or aquifers underlie the
two countries and are therefore international or transboundary: Withdrawals by one Party can drain life-giving water from the other Party, as
a consequence, be the source of severe and protracted conflict;
Acknowledging that due to the long lasting political hostilities between the
Partiesthere is a need to progressively develop the desired cooperative
framework on the utilization of transboundary groundwater;
Recognizing that the increasing populations, industrial and agricultural development, are placing much greater demands on groundwater
supplies, which calls for adequate legal responses by both Parties;
Affirming the need to agree on mechanisms for the transboundary
aquifers in critical areas to be managed by mutual agreement rather
than continuing to be subjected to unilateral leaking;
Recognizing that the fundamental goal is to achieve joint optimum
and sustainable utilization and avoidance or resolution of disputes over
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shared groundwaters in a time of ever increasing pressures upon this
priceless resource;
Seeking to achieve equity and reasonableness in the utilization, protection, and control of transboundary groundwater;
Resolving to protect the quality of the transboundary groundwaters
for present and future generations;
Wishing to resolve amicably any differences that may arise in connection with the use, protection or control of the said transboundary
groundwaters and, for that purpose, to utilize ajoint Committee, and
Concluding that the best means to achieve the rational management
of their transboundary water resources and the protection of the under
ground environment is to adopt in principle, an integrated approach
including, where appropriate, the conjunctive use of surface water and
up groundwater in their border region,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
SCOPE OF THE AGREEMENT
The present Agreement applies to:
1. Uses of transboundary groundwater aquifers and of their waters
and to measures of protection, preservation, and management related
to the uses of those transhoundary groundwater aquifers and their waters. The transboundary aquifer basins are the Northeastern Aquifer
Basin (NEAB) and the Western Aquifer Basin (WAB) and the EMAB.
2. Groundwater installations and infrastructure situated in the border region.
ARTICLE II
GENERAL PURPOSES
1. The Parties recognize their common interest and responsibility
in ensuring the reasonable and equitable development and management of the groundwaters for the well being of their peoples in the
border region-namely those groundwaters found in the NEMAB and
WMAB.

2. The Parties recognize that the EMAB is transboundary and is
considered part of the Jordan River Basin system.
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3. According to paragraph 2 the EMAB has to be treated differendy
to the WMAB and NEMAB.
4. Considering paragraph 2 of this Article, the regulation of the
uses of the EMAB and of its waters shall be part of any future legal arrangement governing the uses of the Jordan River Basin and of its waters.
5. The Parties shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality,
territorial integrity, mutual benefit, and good faith in order to attain
the optimum utilization and conservation of the WMAB and NEMAB
groundwaters and to protect the underground environment.
6. It is also the purpose of the Parties to develop and maintain reliable data any information concerning these aquifers and their waters
in order to use and protect these waters in a rational and informed
manner.
ARTICLE Ill
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
I The Parties shall in their respective territories utilize the transboundary groundwaters in an equitable and reasonable manner. In
particular, these groundwaters shall be used and developed by both
Parties with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization
thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into account the interests of the
Parties, consistent with adequate protection of the transboundary
groundwater aquifers.
2. The Parties shall participate in the use, development, and protection of the transboundary groundwater aquifers and of their waters
in an equitable and reasonable manner. Such participation includes
both the right to utilize the transboundary groundwaters and the duty
to cooperate in the protection and development thereof, as provided
in the present Agreement.
3. The utilization of transboundary groundwater in an equitable
and reasonable manner within the meaning of Article III requires the
Joint Committee to consider all relevant factors such as:
a. Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological/hydrogeological,
matic, ecological, and other factors of a natural character;
b. The reasonable vialI human ueeS o- te Praries

cli-
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c. The reasonable social and economic needs of the Party;
d. The population dependent on the transboundary groundwater
in each State;
e. The effects of the use or uses of the transboundary groundwater
aquifer in the territory of one Party on other Party;
f. Existing uses of transboundary groundwater;
g. The reasonable planned groundwater development requirements;
h. Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of
the water resources of the transboundary groundwater the avoidance
of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters, with due regard for
the technological and financial capabilities of each Party;
i. The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or existing use including the option of artificial recharge
potential; and
j. The practicability of compensations either in cash or in kind one
or the other Party as a means of adjusting competing water demands.
4. In the application of article III, the Parties shall, when the need
arises, enter into consultations in a spirit of cooperation.
5. The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its
importance in comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a reasonable and equitable use, all relevant factors
are to be considered together and a conclusion reached on the basis of
the whole.
6. A water use existing at the time an equitable sharing determination is made shall take precedence over a future use, provided the existing use is beneficial to both Parties and reasonable under the circumstances.
7. A water use shall be deemed an existing use within the meaning
and for the purposes of Article III by reference to, and within the limits
of, the amount of water which has been put to a beneficial use from
the date of inception of construction or comparable acts of implementation to the date of entry into force of this Agreement.
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ARTICLE IV
OBLIGATION NOT TO CAUSE SIGNIFICANT HARM
1. Any of the two Parties shall, in utilizing the transboundary
groundwater aquifers in their territories, take all appropriate measures
to prevent the causing of significant harm to the other Party.
2. Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to one of the Parties, the States whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of
agreement to such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard for the provisions of article III, in consultation with the affected
State, to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to
discuss the question of compensation.
ARTICLE V
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIFFERENT KINDS OF USES
1. In the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use of
an international watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other uses.
2. In the event of a conflict between uses of an international watercourse, it shall be resolved with reference to articles III to IV, with special regard being given to the requirements of vital human needs.
ARTICLE VI
THE JOINT COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE UNDER THIS
AGREEMENT
1. The Joint Committee is designated as the Parties agency to carry
out the functions and responsibilities provided for by this Agreement.
2. The Joint Committee is authorized to declare Transboundary
Groundwater Conservation Areas, Drought Alerts, Drought Emergencies, and Public Health Emergencies and to promulgate the corresponding plans and Depletion Plans, in accordance with the provisions
of this Agreement.
3. The Joint Committee shall have jurisdiction over such additional
matters concerning the border region as are from time to time referred to it by the Governments jointly.
4. The Joint Committee shall have authority to issue the licensing
and the permits for the utilization and protection of groundwater in
the border region;
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5. The Joint Committee shall prepare and propose to the Governments a budget conforming insofar as practicable to the budget cycles
and procedures of the Governments, covering the projected expenses
and capital costs of the Joint Committee's joint operations plant and
staff. The total amount of each budget shall be divided between the
Governments in the proportions agreed upon by the Joint Committee
and approved by the Governments.
6. The budget for the separate operating costs of each national section shall be the responsibility of the respective Government.
7. The Governments may jointly refer a specific matter relating to
transboundary groundwater to the Joint Committee for investigation
or action. Individually Governments may request the Joint Committee
advice relating to transboundary groundwaters on matters originating
within the requesting Government portion of the border region.
8. The Joint Committee shall cause each such referral and request
to be taken up and investigated studied or acted upon as appropriate.
The Joint Committee shall render a report to the Governments on
every referral and request taken up.
9. A Permanent Technical Committee of Water Experts (hereinafter referred to as the Technical Committee) composed of an equal
number of representatives from the Parties, shall be established to assist the Joint Committee in the discharge of its responsibilities. The
Contracting Parties will endeavour to ensure that the respective members of the Committee hold office for a minimum duration of four
consecutive regular sessions.
10. It shall be the duty of the Technical Committee to:
a. prepare for approval by the Contracting Parties through the
Joint Committee schemes for the equitable sharing in the development, conservation and use of the shared river basins;
b. monitor the performance of agreed upon equitable sharing
schemes, and to recommend to the Joint Committee any adjustments
deemed necessary;
c. recommend to the Joint Committee for the adoption by the Parties measures called for by emergency situations related to, or stemming from, agreed upon equitable sharing scheme; and
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d. advise the Joint Committee on any difference concerning the interpretation or implementation of equitable sharing determinations
made pursuant to this Agreement.
11. The Joint Committee shall, in all respects, enjoy the status of an
international body.
ARTICLE VII
ENFORCEMENT AND OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITIES
1. The enforcement of water quality and quantity measures and related land use controls within the territory of each Party shall be the
responsibility of that Party or of its political subdivisions as appropriate.
2. The Joint Committee shall biennially conduct a review of the water quality and quantity control measures taken within each Party's
territory affecting the border region and shall issue a Report containing its assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of programs for
the protection and improvement of the transboundary aquifers and
their waters and withdrawal and land use controls including with respect to any Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Areas, Depletion Plans, Drought Emergency Plans and Health Emergencies. To that
end each Government shall furnish the Joint Committee with the relevant data, information, and studies for use by the Joint Committee in
preparing its Report in accordance with the reporting formats provided by the Joint Committee.
3. In addition to facilitating as needed the Joint Committee's oversight responsibilities under paragraph 2, each Government shall make
a biennial Report to the Joint Committee specifying:
a. the water quality and conservation measures taken;
b. quantities withdrawn transferred and exchanged
c. any problems encountered in carrying out the provisions of this
Agreement or in implementation of any of the conservation depletion
and drought management plans and health emergency measures
adopted.
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ARTICLE VIII
ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF A JOINT
MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT SYSTEMS
1. The Joint Committee is charged with the design, installation,
and maintenance of monitoring systems and the development of joint
assessment systems of the transboundary groundwater aquifers.
2. According to paragraph 1 the Joint Committee should set up
and apply monitoring programs for ground-water protection.
3. These programs should include monitoring at the source of potential pollution which could pose a serious or chronic threat to an
aquifer.
4. There should be regular inspections to ensure compliance with
protection requirements imposed. Attention should also be paid to
the monitoring of ground-water quality changes brought about by airborne pollution.
5. Systematic monitoring should be carried out for all aquifers
found to be vulnerable to pollution and/or over-use, as well as for
those whose particular importance has been recognized for public water supply, mineral water supply, and industry.
6. Facilities should be set up for co-ordinating the assessment and
availability of monitoring data and information on aquifers. The resulting collections of data should be related to information on groundwater quantity and quality characteristics of aquifers as well as details of
their location, use, and exposure to various impacts from land uses
such as agriculture, industry, and urban development. Information
should be readily available to those interested.
7. The data from monitoring should make it possible, inter alia, to
revise periodically plans and forecasts of groundwater use, taking into
account actual evolution of aquifers, and to determine measures necessary to ensure the sustainable use of ground-water resources in the
long term. Legislative provisions and regulations should, as appropriate, allow for the revision of protection requirements imposed depending on the measures thus determined, and
8. Monitoring programs should be periodically reviewed to ensure
that they are achieving their stated aims and that the results have been
used effectively
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ARTICLE IX
ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF THE DATABASE
1. At the request of the Joint Committee the Parties shall:
a. install in their territory the required measuring equipment, and
protect such equipment from interference; and
b. permit and facilitate inspections by the Committee of such
equipment.
2. The Joint Committee is charged with the creation and maintenance of a comprehensive and unified database pertaining to transboundary groundwaters, in the languages of the Parties. The database
shall include an inventory of all transboundary groundwater resources
taking into account quantity, quality, aquifer geometry, recharge rates,
interaction with surface waters, and other pertinent data and shall
identify all transboundary aquifers.
3. The joint Committee shall carry out studies directly, or through
research programs conducted by or with other bodies, public or private:
a. to identify inadequacies in available data and to propose remedial action;
b. to examine present and potential future uses of said groundwaters, taking into account demographic projections and socio-economic
development plans;
c. to assess the impact of present and potential development on
trans-boundary groundwaters and related resources;
d. to study possible alternative sources of surface water and
groundwater for use in the border region, taking into account the
quantity and quality of the waters and the potential for the conjunctive
use of the available waters; and
e. to examine the potential for, and the consequences of, drought,
floods, and contamination in the border region.
4. The Parties undertake to facilitate the acquisition of information
and data by the Joint Committee on a timely basis in accordance with
the Joint Committee's requirements.

Issue I

PROPOSEDGROUNDWATER FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

5. The Joint Committee shall compile, analyze, and disseminate the
data, information, and studies and provide the results to the Governments.
ARTICLE X
WATER QUALITY PROTECTION
1. The Parties undertake cooperatively to protect and to improve,
insofar as practicable, the quality of transboundary aquifers and their
waters in conjunction with their programs for surface water quality
control, and to avoid significant harm in or to the territories of the
Parties.
2. The Governments shall promptly inform the Joint Committee of
any actual or planned, significantly polluting discharge into transboundary groundwaters or recharge areas, or of other activity with the
potential for significant leaching into transboundary groundwaters.
3. The Joint Committee shall without delay consider the gravity of
any situation indicating significant groundwater contamination, or the
threat thereof, in any part of the border region in accordance with the
provisions of Article XI.
4. Upon the studies made in 3 the Joint Committee shall decide
whether or not to grant the required permits for the planned discharge.
ARTICLE XI
TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION AREAS
1. The Joint Committee shall determine the desirability of declaring any area within the border region containing transboundary
groundwaters to be a Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area.
2. In the event that the Joint Committee determines that a Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area is desirable, such determination shall be reported to the Governments with a draft of the proposed declaration and justification therefore, including the delineation of the area and its aquifer(s).
3. If no Government files an objection with the Joint Committee
within one hundred eighty (180) days, the Joint Committee shall issue
the formal declaration. Any objection(s) filed shall specify, with an
explanation the objectionable section(s) of the proposed declaration
orjustification or both.
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4. Unless an objection requires termination of consideration the
Joint Committee shall within ninety (90) days of receipt of objections
report to the Governments a revised proposed declaration, to be effective Paragraph within ninety (90) days, unless a Government files a
subsequent objection with the Joint Committee. If no subsequent objection is filed within the said ninety (90) day period, the formal declaration shall be issued control by the Joint Committee. If a subsequent
objection is filed within the ninety (90) day period the Joint Committee shall refer the matter together with aeration the entire record to
the Governments for resolution by consultation.
5. In making its determination, the Joint Committee shall consider
whether:
a. groundwater withdrawals exceed or are to exceed recharge even
so as to endanger yield or water quality or are likely to diminish water,
the quantity or quality of interrelated surface waters;
b. recharge has been or may become impaired;
c. the use of the included aquifer(s) as an important source of
drinking source of water has been or may become impaired water;
d. the aquifer(s) have been or may become contaminated and;
6. In making its determination the Joint Committee shall take into
account the impact of the implementation of the declaration on the
sources and uses of water previously allocated by agreements between
the Parties or under the Drought Management Plan.
7. The Joint Committee shall periodically review the appropriateness of continuing or modifying Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Areas.
ARTICLE XII
COMPREHENSIVE MANAGEMENT PLANS
1. For each declared Transboundary Groundwater Conservation
Area, the Joint Committee shall prepare a Comprehensive Management Plan for the rational development, use, protection, and control
of the waters in the Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area.
2. A Comprehensive Management Plan may:
a. prescribe measures to prevent, eliminate or mitigate degradation
of transboundary groundwater quality, and for that purpose may:
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(1) classify transboundary groundwaters according to use and coordinate the formulation of water quality standards;
(2) identify toxic and hazardous contaminants in the Area and require a continuing record of such substances from origin to disposal;
(3) establish criteria for the safe storage of wastes and maintain an
inventory of dump sites, abandoned as well as active, that have caused
or may cause transboundary aquifer pollution;
(4) propose a scheme for monitoring water quality conditions including the placement and operation of test wells and for remedial
actions where required, including pre-treatment and effluent discharge limitations and charges; and
(5) provide for the establishment where required of protective
zones in which land use must be regulated
b. allocate the uses of groundwaters and interrelated surface waters
taking into account any other allocation(s) previously made applicable
within the Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area.
c. prescribe measures including pumping limitations, criteria for
well placement and number of new wells, retirement of existing wells,
imposition of extraction fees, planned depletion regimes or reservations of groundwaters for future use.
d. arrange where conditions are favourable, programs of transboundary aquifer recharge.
e. articulate programs of conjunctive use where appropriate.
f. prescribe the integration and coordination of water quality and
quantity control programs.
g. include other measures and actions as may be deemed appropriate by the Joint Committee.
3. The Joint Committee shall submit proposed Comprehensive
Management Plans to the Governments.
a. If no Government files an objection with the Joint Committee
within one hundred eighty (180) days, the Joint Committee shall adopt
the Plan and monitor its implementation.
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b. A Government' s objections shall specify with an explanation the
objectionable portions of the proposed Comprehensive Management
Plan.
c. Within ninety (90) days of receipt of objections, the Joint Committee shall submit to the Governments a revised proposed Comprehensive Management Plan to be effective within ninety (90) days unless
a subsequent objection is filed. If no subsequent objection is filed with
the ninety (90) day period, the proposed Comprehensive Management
Plan shall be adopted and the Joint Committee shall monitor its implementation. If subsequent objections are filed within the ninety (90)
day period, the Joint Committee shall refer the matter, together with
the entire record, to the Governments for resolution by consultation.
4. The Joint Committee is authorized to approve advances and exchanges of water consistent with the objectives of the applicable Comprehensive Management Plan.
5. The Joint Committee shall monitor and evaluate the measures
taken under the Comprehensive Management Plan and shall propose,
as appropriate, modifications there to.
ARTICLE XIII
PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES
1. Upon a determination by the Joint Committee or any Government that there is an imminent or actual public health hazard involving the contamination of transboundary groundwaters, the Joint
Committee shall notify the respective Governments, and may declare a
Public Health Emergency for a stated period.
2. In the event that the Public Health Emergency is not mitigated
or abated within the initial stated period, the Joint Committee may
extend the emergency for such additional period as may be deemed
necessary under the circumstances.
3. On the basis of the declaration, the Joint Committee shall have
authority to investigate the area of imminent or actual contamination
to prescribe measures to prevent, eliminate or mitigate the public
health hazard.
4. The Governments shall provide the indicated information, data,
studies and reports concerning public health emergencies as set forth
in Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article IX.
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ARTICLE XIV
PLANNED DEPLETION
1. The Joint Committee, after evaluation of all relevant considerations, may prepare and, with the consent of the Governments, may
approve a plan for the depletion of an aquifer over a calculated period.
The plan may apportion the uses and specify the rates and means of
extraction of the transboundary groundwaters, and may authorize advances, exchanges and transboundary transfers of water consistent with
the objectives of the Depletion Plan.
2. The Governments shall provide the indicated information, data,
studies and reports concerning depletion as set forth in Paragraphs 2
and 3 of Article VII.
ARTICLE XV
TRANSBOUNDARY TRANSFERS
Nothing in this Agreement shall be so constituted as to preclude either short-term or long-term transfers of waters between the Parties
under terms and conditions approved by the Joint Committee.
ARTICLE XVI
PLANNING FOR DROUGHT
1. The Joint Committee shall, within two (2) years of the coming
into force of this Agreement, complete the preparation of a Drought
Management Plan applicable to the border region for activation in the
region, or in parts thereof, in the event of drought. The completed
Plan shall be submitted to the Governments for standby approval.
2. The Drought Management Plan shall:
a. specify the hydrometeorological preconditions for the declaration of a Drought Alert and, thereunder, the conservation measures to
be observed by all water users within the border region;
b. specify the hydrometeorological preconditions for the declaration of a Drought Emergency and, thereunder, the specific measures
to be observed by all water users within the border region;
c. provide for the monitoring of the hydrometeorological conditions generally in the border region and compliance with prescribed

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 8

conservation or other specific measures under any Drought Alert or
Drought Emergency; and
d. provide for periodic reports to the Governments during any
Drought Alert or Drought Emergency to include any proposed modifications to the Drought Emergency Plan and any modifications made to
the prescribed measures under any Drought Alert or Drought Emergency.
3. The Drought Management Plan may:
a. designate and reserve certain transboundary aquifers or specific
law well sites for use in times of drought;
b. provide, for the duration of any declared Drought Emergency:
(1) the conjunctive management of groundwater and surface water
supplies within or made available to the border region or part(s)
thereof governed by the declaration;
(2) increases and reductions in the normal allowable withdrawals
and at variance with allocations made under a Comprehensive Management Plan for a Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area or
by prior agreements between the Parties maintaining to the extent
practicable the established withdrawal ratios between the Parties and
an equitable balance of all emergency obligations.
(3) authorization to use designated and reserved groundwaters
within the border region.
c. include other structural and non-structural measures deemed
likely to be needed under various drought conditions.
4. The conservation and other specific measures provided in the
Plan or for Drought Alert declarations of Drought Emergency declarations may be modified or suspended by the Joint Committee to meet
the specific requirements of the situation at the time of such declarations and during the time such declarations remain in force.
5. The authority to determine the existence of the preconditions
specified in the approved Drought Management Plan and to declare
drought alerts and drought emergencies thereunder in any portion of
the border region is vested in the Joint Committee.
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6. The Joint Committee is authorized to modify or terminate a declaration of Drought alert or of Drought Emergency when the hydrometeorological conditions so warrant.
7. Declarations of Drought Alert and Drought Emergency, and
modifications to or termination of the same, shall be immediately
communicated to the Governments and published so as to come to the
attention of all water users in the border region.
8. The Governments shall provide the indicated information, data,
studies, and reports concerning drought as set forth in Paragraphs 2
and 3 of Article VII.
ARTICLE XVII
INQUIRY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
1. The Joint Committee shall by general notice invite written statements and information from all persons professing interest in the
groundwater related conditions and activities in the portion of the border region for which a Transboundary Groundwater Conservation
Area declaration, a Comprehensive Management Plan, a Depletion
Plan, a transboundary transfer or a Drought Alert or Emergency declaration is under consideration.
2. All submissions received pursuant to Paragraph 1 shall be taken
into account by the Joint Committee.
3. Whenever the Joint Committee deems that public interest warrants, it shall schedule and conduct hearings open to the public in appropriate places and facilities in the border region, and shall make and
publish a record of such hearings.
4. Any person professing an interest may also petition the Joint
Committee at any time requesting the Joint Committee to schedule a
hearing or to invite written statements and information concerning
groundwater conditions in the border region, or urging the Joint
Committee to take a particular action under this Agreement.
5. When deemed useful by the Joint Committee, technical meetings, workshops, and briefings relating to transboundary groundwater
matters may be held under the auspices of the Joint Committee or in
cooperation with authorities and organizations concerned with the
welfare of the border region.
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ARTICLE XVIII
EXISTING RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
The rights and obligations of the Parties as set forth in prior agreements between the Parties shall not be permanently altered by this
Agreement or any measures taken hereunder.
ARTICLE XIX
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
1. In the event of a dispute between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the present Convention, the Parties shall,
in the absence of an applicable agreement between them, seek a settlement of the dispute by peaceful means in accordance with the following provisions.
2. If the Parties cannot reach agreement by negotiation requested
by one of them, they may jointly seek the good offices of, or request
mediation or conciliation by, a third party, or make use, as appropriate, of any joint watercourse institutions that may have been established by them or agree to submit the dispute to arbitration or to the
International Court ofJustice.
3. Subject to the operation of paragraph 10, if after six months
from the time of the request for negotiations referred to in paragraph
2, the Parties have not been able to settle their dispute through negotiation or any other means referred to in paragraph 2, the dispute shall
be submitted, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, to impartial fact-finding in accordance with paragraphs 4 to 9, unless the
Parties otherwise agree.
4. A Fact-finding Commission shall be established, composed of
one member nominated by each Party and in addition a member not
having the nationality of any of the Parties chosen by the nominated
members who shall serve as Chairman.
5. If the members nominated by the Parties are unable to agree on
a Chairman within three months of the request for the establishment
of the Commission, any Party may request the Secretary-General of the
United Nations to appoint the Chairman who shall not have the nationality of any of the parties to the dispute or of any riparian State of
the watercourse concerned. If one of the Parties fails to nominate a
member within three months of the initial request pursuant to para-rh
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of any of the parties to the dispute or of any riparian State of the watercourse concerned. The person so appointed shall constitute a single-member Commission.
6. The Commission shall determine its own procedure.
7. The Parties have the obligation to provide the Commission with
such information as it may require and, on request, to permit the
Commission to have access to their respective territory and to inspect
any facilities, plant, equipment, construction, or natural feature relevant for the purpose of its inquiry.
8. The Commission shall adopt its report by a majority vote, unless
it is a single-member Commission, and shall submit that report to the
Parties setting forth its findings and the reasons therefore and such
recommendations as it deems appropriate for an equitable solution of
the dispute, which the Parties shall consider in good faith.
9. The expenses of the Commission shall be borne equally by the
Parties.
10. When ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the present Convention, or at any time thereafter, a Party which is not a regional economic integration organization may declare in a written instrument submitted to the Depositary that, in respect of any dispute
not resolved in accordance with paragraph 2, it recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement in relation to any Party
accepting the same obligation:
a. Submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice;
and/or
b. Arbitration by an arbitral tribunal established and operating,
unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agreed, in accordance with
the procedure laid down in the annex to the present Convention.
A Party which is a regional economic integration organization may
make a declaration with like effect in relation to arbitration in accordance with subparagraph (b).
ARTICLE XX
AMENDMENT
This Agreement may be amended by agreement of the Parties.
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ARTICLE XXI
ENTRY INTO FORCE
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the exchange
of instruments of ratification [signature by the duly authorized representatives of the Parties].

ARTICLE XXII
AUTHENTIC TEXTS
This Agreement has been concluded in two originals, one in
the.....language and one in the..... language, both being equally authentic.
ARTICLE XXIII
RESERVATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS
Any reservations or exceptions made by one Party upon signature
or ratification shall be effective to modify this Agreement only after
express acceptance by the other Parties.

